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A TRUISM THAT ISN'T TRUE? THE TENTH
AMENDMENT AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWER
D. A. Jeremy Telman'

[T]he Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous
to the Liberties of their People. For when their Successors,
managing the Government with different Thoughts, would draw
the Actions of those good Rulers into Precedent, and make them
the Standard of their Prerogative,as if what had been done only
for the good of the People was a right in them to do, for the harm
of the People, if they so pleased; it has often occasioned Contest,
and sometimes publick Disorders, before the People could
recover their originalRight, and get that to be declared not to be
Prerogative,which truly was never so.
- John Locke, Second Treatise on Government'

I. INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that all powers not delegated to the government of the United States are
reserved to the several states or to the people! The sacred cow of
federalism, this amendment has played a limited role in the constitutional
history of the United States. It is invoked whenever congressional
legislative powers threaten the independent law making power of the
several states. In that context, however, the Tenth Amendment does not
tell us very much. After all, if powers are not delegated to the federal
government, where else would they reside but in the states? Accordingly,

* Associate, Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, New York, New York. B.A. 1985, Columbia
University; Ph.D., 1993, Cornell University; J.D., 1999, New York University School of
Law. Portions of this Article draw on research that I conducted while a Junior Fellow
with the Center for International Studies at the New York University School of Law. That
research was directed towards addressing the difficulties involved in reconciling the
United States' participation in collective security regimes with the constitutional allocation
of war powers. I am grateful to Christopher Eisgruber, Louis Fisher, Thomas Franck,
David Golove, David Malone, Matthew Morris, Georg Nolte, Jay Parker, and John Yoo
for their comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. John Locke, Second Treatise § 166, in JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967).

2.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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the Supreme Court has criticized the Amendment as a truism.'
However, the consequences of this truism are not as simple as they first
appear. When one reads the text of the Tenth Amendment it is difficult
to imagine that anyone could argue that it applies only to Congress'
power and not to all branches of the federal government. Nonetheless,
the doctrine of inherent executive authority, a theoretical relic from the
constitutional monarchies which supplied some of the raw materials for
the United States' system of governance,4 is enjoying a renaissance in
debates over the allocation of war powers. According to the theory of
inherent executive authority, certain powers are unique to the sovereign.
Consequently, those powers reside in the federal Executive and require
no constitutional delegation. This theory implies that the doctrine of
limited government, which finds its clearest constitutional expression in
the Tenth Amendment, applies only to the Congress. By attempting to
provide an extra-constitutional source for executive power, advocates of
the theory of inherent executive power transform the Tenth Amendment
into a truism that is not true. For them, a power that is not delegated to
any branch of the federal government is not reserved to the states or the
people if it is part of the inherent power of the Executive.
This argument ought to scandalize devotees of the Tenth Amendment.
More scandalous still, in the context of war powers debates, advocates of
inherent executive authority lay claim for the Executive, powers
expressly delegated to Congress. Because the Constitution allocates
limited war powers to the President, debates over the allocation of war
powers are often said to take place in a "zone of twilight" where the
Executive and the Legislature have concurrent power or where the
allocation of powers between them is left unclear in the Constitution.'
But the Constitution expressly delegates to Congress numerous war
3. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The Supreme Court stated that:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might
not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id.; see also John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment
Since United States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445 (1996-1997) (exploring the fate of the

Tenth Amendment in Supreme Court decisions since 1941).
4. See the discussion of the theory of inherent executive authority infra
accompanying notes 215-36.
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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powers, and the Tenth Amendment prevents the re-allocation of those
powers back to the Executive based on some anterior theory of inherent
executive power.
The Tenth Amendment is a truism with respect to federalist doctrine,
as it does nothing to alter the distribution of powers between the federal
government and the states. This Article does not propose that we ought
to consider altering the distribution of war powers between the federal
Instead, this Article explores the
government and the states.
viewed as a general statement of
Amendment,
of
the
Tenth
ramifications
the principle of limited government, for the allocation of war powers
between the two political branches of the federal government.
Specifically, this Article argues that the theory of inherent executive
powers, on which arguments for unilateral, non-defensive executive war
powers rely, cannot be reconciled with the theory of limited government
embodied in the Tenth Amendment; therefore, unilateral, non-defensive
executive war powers are not permitted under the United States
Constitution. Part I of this Article reviews the history behind the
adoption of the Tenth Amendment and discusses its aims. The Tenth
Amendment was designed to protect the states from encroachments by
the federal government on their independent sovereignty,' and its
Framers did not foresee it as a weapon in battles among the coordinate
branches over the proper allocation of powers among them. But they
also did not foresee the expansion of executive war powers that has
occurred since World War II. Part I defends the more expansive use of
the Tenth Amendment advocated here based on a view of the Tenth
Amendment as a constraint on executive as well as legislative power.
Part II of this Article discusses textual and historical evidence in favor
of congressional war powers and then considers two types of historical
arguments for unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers. The first
argument asserts the existence of a "quasi-constitutional custom," which
transforms the President's traditional powers to "repel sudden attacks" 7
into a general theory of executive control over the introduction of the
United States Armed Forces (Armed Forces) into hostilities. Next, the
6. In defending the new Constitution against its anti-Federalist detractors, James
Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal

Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments
are numerous and indefinite." THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison)
(Buccaneer Book 1992).
7. During the Const:tutional Convention, James Madison suggested substituting the
word "declare" for "make" in the constitutional enumeration of Congress' war powers.

The idea was that the President ought to have the power to repel sudden attacks. 2 THE
RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
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Article addresses arguments that would derive unilateral, non-defensive
executive war powers, in certain instances, from the United States'
ratification of international instruments that obligate it to participate in
collective security measures. This Article maintains that textual and
historical arguments in favor of unilateral, non-defensive executive war
powers fail on their own terms; they can be defeated without recourse to
the Tenth Amendment. Nonetheless, such recourse is necessary because
the textual and historical arguments ultimately rely on the theory of
inherent executive authority.
Part III of this Article addresses the theory of unilateral executive
authority. Here, the Tenth Amendment plays a crucial role in protecting
Congress' unique war powers. Unilateral, non-defensive executive war
powers cannot exist because the Tenth Amendment articulates a general
doctrine of limited government and does not allow for the exercise of
power by any branch of the federal government to which that power has
not been explicitly or implicitly delegated. As the war powers in
question are clearly allocated to the Legislature, they cannot be
transferred to the Executive without an express delegation or a
constitutional amendment. Because no such delegation or amendment
has occurred, unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers violate the
constitution.
Parts of this Article focus on the aims of the Framers in allocating war
powers and in introducing the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
This focus does not reflect a commitment to "originalism" as the optimal
mode of constitutional interpretation. Rather, the purpose is to oppose
those who have made inaccurate claims about original intention and to
present a compelling account both of what the constitutional allocation
of war powers is and what it ought to be.
The rise of administrative agencies has created a huge expansion of
executive power. This Article does not question the legality of these
administrative agencies; their existence can be reconciled with the theory
of the Tenth Amendment presented here, so long as those agencies are
created through explicit congressional grants of authority and Congress
acts within its powers of delegation.8 If the Tenth Amendment can
operate to refute claims of inherent executive authority, it has
ramifications beyond the field of war powers. However, each conflict
between the Executive and the Legislature over the allocation of powers
8. The non-delegation doctrine, dormant since the 1930s, may have been revived in
a recent decision by the D.C. Circuit. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d
1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh'g by, 195 F.3d 4 (1999), cert. granted sub nom. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
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has its own particularities. This Article is limited to developing a strong
case for the deployment of the Tenth Amendment against those who
would use the theory of inherent executive power to proclaim the
existence of unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers.
Since the advent of collective security regimes such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security
Council (Security Council), the United States, with increasing frequency,
has committed its Armed Forces to collective security activities using
processes that engage the executive branch but bypass Congress'
constitutional war powers. As a result, the post-war era, and especially
the post-Cold-War era, has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of
unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers.
This expansion of
executive war powers cannot be justified based on either the
constitutional text or on the legislative history behind the Constitution.
Scholars and representatives of the executive branch have generally
proposed historical arguments in support of unilateral executive war
powers, while scholars and representatives of the legislative branch have
provided historical counter-arguments.
This Article argues first that all arguments in support of unilateral,
non-defensive executive war powers rely on a theory of inherent
executive authority that is without support in either the constitutional
text or in the political history of the United States. The Article further
contends that the theory of inherent executive authority cannot be
reconciled with the Tenth Amendment, read not as a statement of
federalist principles but as a general declaration that the powers of all
branches of the federal government are limited to those delegated to
them.
The Tenth Amendment limits not only what the branches of the
federal government can do in light of the sovereign powers of the several
states, it also limits what each branch of the federal government can do in
light of the enumeration of powers contained in the Constitution. So
read, the Tenth Amendment does not permit powers allocated to one
branch of the federal government to be transferred to another branch
absent a clear and constitutionally-sanctioned delegation. Accordingly,
the Tenth Amendment commands that the Executive may not commit
the United States Armed Forces to non-defensive measures absent
congressional approval of those measures.
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THE UNDISCOVERED TENTH AMENDMENT

I did not suppose, and I am not persuaded, that history leaves it
open to question, at least in the courts, that the executive branch,
like the Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated
powers.
- Justice Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube'

A. Aims and Purposes of the Framers
The second of the Articles of Confederation guaranteed each state its
"sovereignty, freedom and independence.""' Article II went on to state
that "every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States" is retained by
the states."
Many anti-Federalists wanted an amendment to the
Constitution that would provide protections of state sovereignty similar
to those afforded by Article II.12 When presented with the Constitution

for ratification, six states recommended an amendment along the lines of
the Tenth Amendment.'3 Five of those states submitted drafts that would
have limited the federal government to the exercise of "expressly"
delegated powers, and one draft called for the federal government to
exercise only "clearly" delegated powers. 4 It is no coincidence that
James Madison, who drafted the final version of the Amendment, came
from Virginia, the only state that proposed an amendment that did not
specifically limit the federal government to the exercise of expressly
delegated powers."
Madison himself viewed the amendment as
"superfluous" and "unnecessary," but he conceded, "there can be no
harm in making such a declaration.""
In 1789, Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina proposed
adding the word "expressly" prior to "delegated" in the text of the Tenth
Amendment, in order to clarify the extent to which the states retained
9.

343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).

10. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 1I(1781).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Vile, supra note 3, at 448.
13. Charles A. Lofgren, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty,
and the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 331, 347 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 459 (J.Gales ed., 1789).
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Madison opposed the change, arguing that the
their powers.17
Constitution must allow the government to exercise implied powers

because a constitution could not descend into the minutia of the exercise
of the federal powers." Tucker's proposal was defeated without a vote,

and a similar proposal brought by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was
defeated by a vote of thirty-two to seventeen.' 9
In contrast to Article II of the Articles of Confederation, the Tenth
Amendment is, by design, an anemic protector of federalist principles.
The difference can only be understood as the product of the Framers'
design for a much heartier form of federal union in the new Republic.
When federalist issues have arisen in case law, the amendment has
tended to lose out to the more muscular provisions of Article I, the

Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

°

To those for whom Article II of the Confederation provided a model
for the delineation of the division of powers between the federal
government and the states, the final version of the amendment

exacerbated the centralizing tendencies of the new government 2 '
However, none of the Framers ever expressed any doubt that the Tenth
Amendment, to the extent that it stands for anything, limits the powers
of the entire federal government, not just those of its legislative arm, to
those powers named in (or implied by) the Constitution. The purpose of

17. Id. at 790.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 797.
20. For the first dramatic showdown between the Tenth Amendment and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), which held
that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power "to exercise its best
judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of
the government." Id. at 420. The Supreme Court has allowed extraordinary expansions of
Congress' Commerce Clause power over objections based in the Tenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (allowing Congress to regulate
intrastate economic activity if such activities have cumulative effects on interstate or
international commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262
(1964) (permitting congressional preemption of express state laws affecting private
commercial activities so long as the means chosen by Congress are reasonably adapted to
a permissible constitutional end); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the
application of amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to the production
of homegrown wheat); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(recognizing Congress' power to regulate intrastate activities that have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their regulation is essential to protect
interstate commerce from burdens or obstructions); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 197 (1824)
(stating that the commerce power is vested as absolutely in Congress as it would be in a
single government whose powers were restricted as the Constitution restricts our federal
government).
21. See Lofgren, supra note 13, at 349.
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the Tenth Amendment was to limit the powers of the federal government
and to protect the sovereign prerogatives of the several states. The
Framers did not intend the Tenth Amendment to effect a limitation of
Congress' power alone. James Iredell, speaking at the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention in 1788 thus repeatedly stressed that powers not
delegated to Congress "or to the departments of the general
government" are retained by the states." The version of the Tenth
Amendment that was ratified and included in the Bill of Rights states
simply that the powers not delegated to the United States are reserved to
the states and to the people. 23 The amendment does not restrict itself to
establishing limitations on any particular branch of the federal
government.
B. Deploying the Tenth Amendment
Few constitutional provisions have elicited as little commentary as has
the Tenth Amendment. 24 Much of what has been written focuses on the
question of whether the Tenth Amendment actually adds something to
the Constitution, and these writings generally pit the Tenth Amendment
against the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in
order to determine whether the Constitution limits the federal
government to the exercise of its expressly enumerated powers or
permits the exercise of implied powers as well.25
22. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 249 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1996).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24. There are few works that devote a great deal of space to the interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
23.

77-87 (1987); Vile, supra note 3; Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The Original Understandingof the
Tenth Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT

UNDERSTANDING 455 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991); Murray Dry, Federalism and
the Constitution: The Founders' Design and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 233 (1987); Lofgren, supra note 13; Walter Berns, The
Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 126 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963). See Lofgren, supra note 13, at 331
(noting that a survey of Supreme Court decisions through 1972 allocated only eight pages
to a discussion of the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, while 140 pages were
devoted to the Commerce Clause and 255 pages to the Fourteenth Amendment) (citing
CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1263-71

(1973)).
25. Raoul Berger argues against the received wisdom that the Tenth Amendment is a
mere truism. According to Berger, the Amendment "was added to put the obvious
beyond peradventure." BERGER, supra note 24, at 80. That is, it strengthens the claim of
the states that they retain powers not delegated. Id. Berger reads Madison's insistence
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Joseph Story was among the first individuals to comment on the
difference between the force of Article II of the Confederation, which
limits the federal government to the exercise of powers expressly granted
it, and the Tenth Amendment, which acknowledges that the federal
26
government can legitimately exercise implied powers. Story considered
the amendment to be a mere affirmation of a necessary rule of
constitutional interpretation:
Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it
follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and
belongs to the state authorities, if invested by their constitutions
of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is
retained BY THE PEOPLE, as a part of their residuary
sovereignty."
Following Story, Walter Berns argued that the Tenth Amendment has
a declaratory function and provides a rule of constitutional interpretation
28
rather than a rule of constitutional law.
Berns showed how the
amendment might have had a greater effect on American federalism if it
were interpreted to restrict the federal government to the exercise of
expressly enumerated powers. 29 As it stands, the amendment tells us
nothing about the relationship of congressional power to that of the
states that was not already established in Article I.
Since the exercise of federal legislative power has given rise to the
most frequent conflict with the powers of state governments, the Tenth
Amendment, viewed as an instrument for protecting the states against
encroachments by the federal government, has been invoked exclusively
against congressional actions. In that context, however, the amendment
is merely declaratory of the relationship between the federal government

that the word "expressly" be omitted as evidence of Madison's intent to enable the
Necessary and Proper Clause to do its work. Id. at 86. Berger concludes that the
Amendment assured the "continuing vitality of the states as prime law makers in most

affairs."

Id. at 87 (citing

WILLIAM HURST, THE LEGITIMACY

OF THE BUSINESS

CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (1970)).

26.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED

§ 1900 (1833) ("It is a general principle, that all corporate bodies possess all
powers incident to a corporate capacity, without being absolutely expressed.").
27. Id.
28. Berns, supra note 24, at 131-32, 145.
29. See id. at 133-36 (discussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), three cases in
which the Court has read the Tenth Amendment as if it limited the federal government to
the exercise of expressly delegated powers, but criticizing those cases for misreading the
Tenth Amendment).
STATES,
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and the states established in the text of the Constitution.3 °
The question of where to draw the line between federal commerce
powers and state sovereignty has caused the Supreme Court great
difficulties. The latest cycle of reversals began in 1976, when, by a five to
four vote, the Court for the first time invalidated an act of Congress on
Tenth Amendment grounds.3 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority
in National League of Cities v. Usery, declared that provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which extended its wage and overtime provisions
to state employees, violated the Tenth Amendment by impairing the
states' "ability to function effectively in a federal system."32 Less than
ten years after Usery, also by a five to four vote, the Court reversed
itself.33 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that
"[a]part from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. 3 4 Justice
Rehnquist wrote a one-paragraph dissent declaring, in essence, that

30. Echoing Darby, one commentator concluded that the Tenth Amendment was
merely "[d]eclaratory of the overall constitutional scheme" and "had no independent
force as originally understood." Lofgren, supra note 13, at 350. Another commentator
similarly concluded that the Tenth Amendment provides no special protection for the
states beyond what is implicit in the enumeration of powers itself. Dry, supra note 24, at
247.
31. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The claim that this was the first case
to rely solely on the Tenth Amendment to invalidate an act of Congress comes from Dry.
Dry, supra note 24, at 235. In addition, Dry argues that on previous occasions, when the
Court struck down acts of Congress on federalism grounds, it strictly construed one of
Congress' enumerated powers and then buttressed that reading with the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 235 n.8. Usery overturned Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), a
case decided only eight years earlier. Usery, 426 U.S. at 855. Justice Blackmun's decisive
concurring vote in Usery was lukewarm at best: "Although I am not untroubled by certain
possible implications of the Court's opinion -- some of them suggested by the dissents -- I
do not read the opinion so despairingly as does my Brother BRENNAN." Id. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Brennan claimed that the majority's
treatment of the Tenth Amendment as an express declaration of a state sovereignty
limitation on the federal government would require the Court to overrule fundamental
cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S 316 (1819), and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. 304 (1816). Usery, 426 U.S. at 861-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to
Brennan, these cases "hold that nothing in the Tenth Amendment constitutes a limitation
on congressional exercise of powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress." Id. at 862
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
33. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
34. Id. at 550.
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Usery would rise again.3" So far, it has not.36
As Article I contains its own detailed enumeration of the powers of the
legislature, the Tenth Amendment is especially redundant with respect to
Congress' powers. Article I makes it clear that Congress can only
exercise the powers enumerated therein, including all powers implied
from the enumeration through the Necessary and Proper Clause.37 The
Tenth Amendment, consistent with Article I, limits the federal
government to the exercise of enumerated powers and powers implicit
therein. Because the limitation of Congress' power is clear from Article
I, the Tenth Amendment does important textual work only with respect
to the executive branch of the federal government, whose limitations are
not specifically enumerated in Article 11.38
35. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995), the Court invalidated the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V. 1988)
("GFSZA"), which made it a criminal act to bring a gun into a school. Id. The reasoning
in Lopez was similar to earlier cases in which the Court argued that Congress had
exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. The Tenth Amendment played its
wonted supporting role in the Lopez decision. However, it is unclear that Lopez
establishes a strong precedent for a serious restriction on Congress' power, since the
Court's crucial swing votes, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, filed a separate concurrence
which seemed to require only that Congress make some colorable argument justifying its
actions under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In
the case of the GFSZA, Congress simply failed to make a case in the record that there was
a link between guns in schools and interstate commerce. Id. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court imposed more substantial limitations on the Commerce
Clause in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). In that case, the Court,
citing Lopez, found that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers as well as its
powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in establishing a civil remedy in
the Violence Against Woman Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Id. The Court so found, despite
extensive legislative history establishing a link between violence against women and a
woman's inability to get the training, education, and experience necessary for full
participation in interstate commerce. Id. However, in deciding this case, the majority did
not discuss the Tenth Amendment. The dissenters touched on the Tenth Amendment
only briefly. Id. at 648 (Souter, J., dissenting).
This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court has given up the federalist cause. On the
contrary, it now protects states' rights through the Eleventh Amendment instead of the
Tenth. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(holding that Congress lacks power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks power to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for alleged violations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999)
(finding that Congress has no power under Article I to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity from suit in their own courts).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
38. In addition, the Constitution provides that there must be one Supreme Court.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. However, while the Constitution generally provides that federal
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The Tenth Amendment stands for the general proposition that the
federal government is one of limited powers. As such, it cannot co-exist
with the theory of inherent executive power. Because there is no
question that the Constitution delegates powers over foreign policy and
war to the federal government,39 the Tenth Amendment raises no
federalism issues with respect to the war power. However, because it
imposes a limitation on all branches of the federal government, the
Tenth Amendment addresses the separation of powers among the
branches of the federal government and thus helps to determine which
branch may exercise delegated powers. Powers delegated to the
legislative branch must be exercised by that branch, absent lawful
delegation or constitutional amendment. Nothing in the legislative or
subsequent history of the Tenth Amendment contradicts this more
expansive reading of its significance. Because war powers are allocated
to Congress and not to the Executive, the Executive cannot exercise
those powers without violating the Tenth Amendment.
The next part of this Article begins by establishing that the
constitutional allocation of war powers clearly favors congressional
control. To that end, the Article addresses textual and historical
arguments regarding the constitutional allocation of war powers. Once
that allocation is established, the Article returns to the issue that is at the
heart of it: the Tenth Amendment refutes the argument that there are
inherent executive war powers, on which all arguments for unilateral,
non-defensive war powers ultimately rely.
III.

WAR POWERS: ESCAPE FROM THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT

Whatever difficulties may arise in defining the executive authority
in particularcases, there can be none in deciding on an authority
courts shall have jurisdiction over enumerated "cases, in law or equity," U.S. CONST. art.
IlI, § 2, cl. 1, that jurisdiction is dependent on the establishment of lower courts, which
Congress "may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
Accordingly, with the exception of a few provisions for the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, the powers of the federal judiciary are
limited to those powers that Congress has to delegate under Article 1. The Article I
enumeration thus, for the most part, sets out the outer limits of the judiciary's powers as
well.
39. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down
Massachusetts "Burma Law," which prohibited the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from
engaging in trade with the Republic of Myanmar, on the grounds that the law was
preempted under the Supremacy Clause and interfered with congressional statutes
empowering the President to control United States' economic relations with Myanmar and
to act in the interests of national security).
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clearly placed by the constitution in another department.
- James Madison, Helvidius Letter No. 240
While the tendency of recent presidents to assert unilateral, nondefensive executive war powers has fueled a scholarly and political
debate on the question of the constitutional allocation of war powers, the

allocation of those powers is clear.4' Scholars who argue otherwise must
overcome numerous textual and historical obstacles. The Constitution
grants to Congress the power to declare war, 42 but the President, as
40. James Madison, Helvidius No. 2, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 151,
153 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
41. Most scholars who address this issue agree that the Framers granted war powers
to Congress in order to check the Executive's power to embroil the country in war or
other armed conflict. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); W.
TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS
THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? (1981); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH ET AL., TO CHAIN
THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS INHISTORY AND LAW (1986); Louis
Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL.
SCI. Q. 1 (1998); Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President,and
the United Nations, 81 GEO. L. J. 597, 601, 612 (1993); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War,
41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991). Other scholars stress the distinction between offensive and
defensive war powers and argue for extensive presidential powers to defend the United
States and its interests.
Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution:
Debunking the "Imperial President" Myth, 19 HARV. L. J. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 541-542
(1996); Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the
Constitution:A Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
903 (1994). A third group of scholars interprets Congress' war powers very narrowly.
Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More Unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution Revisited,
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, (1986); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War
Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845 (1.996) (reviewing LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995) and defending the first position against the
other two); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understandingof War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11. John Yoo argues that the power to declare war is
judicial and not legislative. Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 41, at 248. By
declaring war, Congress issues a judgment on a current status of relations; it does not
authorize war. Id. Yoo's argument overlooks the fact that Congress' power to declare
war includes the power to refuse to do so and thus to place limits on the use of force.
Because of this power, a declaration of war is an authorization of war. See, WORMUTH,
supra note 41, at 75-85 (discussing congressional refusals to authorize the President to use
force). Yoo expands this argument and urges that American Presidents exercise the
power known in the eighteenth century as the power to declare war. John Yoo, Kosovo,
War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1689 (2000). But see
Louis Fisher, Unchecked PresidentialWars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1652, 1660-62 (2000)
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Commander-in-Chief, has the power to command the Armed Forces.43
Acting pursuant to that authority, Presidents unilaterally have dispatched
the Armed Forces abroad on over 200 occasions.4 But the President also
has the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the United States and to

preserve, protect and defend the Constitution•.4

Thus, the President

must abide by the laws duly established by Congress. This part of the
Article seeks to show that the power to put the United States in a state of
war, including the lesser power to commit the Armed Forces to conflicts
short of war, resides with Congress.
A review of the constitutional text itself and of the writings of the
Framers establishes their intention to entrust the war power to the
Legislature. This intention is now obscured by over two centuries of
history, during which Congress has often acquiesced in the unilateral
executive authorization of the use of force. However, the fact that
Congress has allowed the repeated abuse of executive power does
nothing to legitimate the practice as a matter of law.46 The Constitution
does not authorize unilateral executive action outside of the context of
Congress can at any time re-assert its
necessary self-defense.4 1
constitutional powers and put a stop to any unilateral executive use of
force. Moreover, as argued in Part II, the Tenth Amendment stands for
(criticizing Yoo's interpretation of the Declare War clause).
43. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
44. In 1973, Senator Barry Goldwater's legal assistant, Terry Emerson, published a
list of "199 U.S. military hostilities abroad without a declaration of war." WORMUTH,
supra note 41, at 143. For a more recent compilation, see ELLEN COLLIER, INSTANCES OF
USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1989 (Congressional Research
Service, 1989), reprinted in THOMAS FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS

650-667 (2d ed. 1993).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
46. While the advocates of unilateral, non-defensive executive powers point to these
hundreds of instances in which Presidents have authorized the use of force without first
consulting Congress, defenders of congressional powers point to authorities such as Felix
Frankfurter and Earl Warren for the proposition that unconstitutional actions are not
rendered legal through repetition. WORMUTH, supra note 41, at 133-34 (citing Inland
Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
546 (1969)).
47. The line between defensive and non-defensive military action is easily obscured.
Nevertheless, Congress has never disputed the President's constitutional power to
authorize the defensive deployment of the Armed Forces. Accordingly, even if there were
no basis for unilateral defensive executive war powers, the President would have such
powers as a matter of quasi-constitutional custom. I discuss the argument for unilateral
non-defensive executive war powers, infra, text accompanying footnotes 95-147. While I
am unconvinced by that argument in the context of non-defensive war powers, I am
convinced that we have recognized the quasi-constitutional custom of defensive executive
war powers.
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the general proposition that no branch of the federal government can
exercise powers that the Constitution has not allocated to it. The
Constitution specifically grants numerous war powers to Congress. The
Tenth Amendment provides that the Executive cannot arrogate those
powers to itself.
A.

War Powers and the Constitutional Text

The Framers repeatedly stated that Congress was to have the
dominant role in decision-making processes that could ultimately
embroil the United States in war and in military ventures short of war.
In addition to the power to declare war, 48 the Framers also granted
Congress the power to raise and support armies,
to provide and
maintain a navy, 0 and to make rules for the regulation of the land and
naval forces." The Constitution supplements Congress' power to declare
war with powers to grant letters of marque and reprisal.52 These powers
are now generally understood to give Congress control over undeclared
as well as declared war.53 Finally, Congress alone can appropriate funds
for use by the Armed Forces.54 In short, the textual evidence is
overwhelming. The few scholars who have attempted to argue otherwise
face an uphill battle.55 There is no other area where the Framers made
their intentions manifest through so many separate constitutional
provisions.
Those who question congressional war powers often point out that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
art. I, §8 cl. 11. Letters of marque authorize trading vessels - public

or private - to attack foreign ships or private vessels, whether during war or peace.
Letters of reprisal similarly authorize the use of force by public or private forces to
retaliate against a foreign sovereign. See Peter Raven-Hansen, ConstitutionalConstraints:
The War Clause, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR:
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 29, 30-31 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H.

Halperin eds., 1994). Although the congressional powers of granting letters of marque
and reprisal have rarely been invoked since the early nineteenth century, Jules Lobel
argues that these powers are still relevant in the context of United States covert military
operations. According to Lobel, Congress must authorize such covert actions because
they fall within Congress' traditional non-delegable authority to issue letters of marque
and reprisal. Jules Lobel, Covert War and CongressionalAuthority: Hidden War and
ForgottenPower, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1035-36, 1109 (1986).

53.
54.
1,§9, cl.
55.

Raven-Hansen, supra note 52, at 31.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 19 (the Necessary and Proper Clause); U.S. CONST. art.
7 (the Appropriations Clause).
See discussion infra, accompanying notes 192-214.
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56
Congress has exercised the power to declare war on only five occasions.
Each time, the declaration came at the President's request. 7 The rarity
of congressional declarations is less surprising when one considers that
declarations of war "had gone out of fashion at least a hundred years
before the Federal Convention met in Philadelphia. 58 In any case, the
power to declare war constitutes a small part of Congress' war powers.
The war powers painstakingly enumerated in Article I, Section Eight of
the Constitution make clear the Framers' intention that Congress has
control over all non-defensive uses of the Armed Forces. 59
By contrast, the Constitution allocates only paltry war powers to the
611
Executive. Presidential war powers derive •from
61 the executive powers,
•
from the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, and from the foreign
relations power. 6' All of these powers are narrowly circumscribed. The
records of the Federal Convention make clear that the Framers intended
the
for Congress to take the initiative in war but for the President to have
attacks., 63
power to defend the country, the power to "repel sudden
There is an important difference between the way Article I of the
Constitution vests the legislature with power and the way Article II of
the Constitution vests the Executive with power. Article I begins, "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
That introductory vesting clause, read together with
United States. ..
the explicit enumeration in Section Eight of Article I, indicates the
Framers' intention to limit the Legislature to those powers specifically
enumerated. Article II begins, "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America., 65 Article II specifically lists

56: Louis Fisher counts eleven occasions on which Congress has declared war, but
that includes the multiple declarations of war during World War I and World War II.
Fisher, Unchecked Wars, supra note 42, at 1652.

57. Congress declared war on England in 1812, on Mexico in 1846, on Spain in 1898,
and in the two World Wars. Id. at 1652. On at least one occasion, Congress has refused to
declare war at the request of a President. In 1815, Congress refused President Madison's
request for a declaration of war against Algiers. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER,
supra note 42, at 27-28 (providing a historical background for Congress' decision not to
authorize war). Congress instead authorized only limited action at sea. Id.
58.

BRIEN HALLETT, THE LOST ART OF DECLARING WAR 34 (1998).

59.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.

60.

U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1, cl. 1.

61.
62.
CONST.
63.
64.
65.
vesting

U.S. CONST. art. !1,§ 2, cl. 1.
The President's power in this realm can be derived from the treaty power, U.S.
art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2, and the power to receive ambassadors, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
FARRAND, supra note 7, at 318-19.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 1. The difference between the Article I and Article 11
clauses has been called into question recently. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
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some presidential powers, but advocates of unilateral executive powers

interpret those specifically enumerated powers as mere instances of
executive power and not the whole of it.66 Alexander Hamilton was
among the first to argue that the difference between the vesting clauses
in the first two articles of the Constitution signals the Framers' intention

to create inherent executive power.67 James Madison disagreed, arguing
that the Constitution vests but a few powers in the Executive and that it
does not countenance the exercise of powers that are legislative in their
611
nature by the Executive or vice versa.
Hamilton's argument was not seconded until well into this century, for
reasons best articulated by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in
the Steel Seizure Case. The Solicitor General, arguing on behalf of the

government in that case claimed that Article I vests in the Executive all
the executive powers of which the government is capable. 69 "It is
difficult," Jackson quipped, "to see why the forefathers bothered to add
several specific items, including some trifling ones."7 ° After comparing
the notion of inherent executive power to the powers enjoyed by George
III, continental monarchs, and totalitarian dictators, Justice Jackson
concluded, "I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of
all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the
presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated."'" Like the

Legislature, the Executive can exercise powers that are implicit in its

Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-49 (1994)
(arguing that the vesting clause of Article 11 implicitly includes a "herein granted"
provision similar to that of the vesting clause of Article I). For an extended refutation of
Lessig and Sunstein and a defense of the theory of a unitary executive,'see Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 547-75 (1994).
66. Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 196 (1988) (comments of Eugene V. Rostow).
67. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 33, 38-40 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969).
68. Madison, supra note 40, at 147-48. The same approach seems to have informed
Justice Black's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case. Justice Black found Truman's attempt to
seize control of the steel mills unconstitutional on the ground that "[t]here is no statute
that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here,"
Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952), and "it is not claimed
that express constitutional language grants this power to the President." Id. at 587. But
see Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 53, 64-65 (1953) (criticizing Black's opinion as creating arbitrary principles for the
purpose of disposing of a particular case).
69. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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delegated powers." However, the Executive cannot arrogate to itself war
powers that the Constitution has delegated to the Legislature.
Any argument to the contrary ignores not only the overwhelming
textual evidence but the historical context in which the Constitution
came into existence. After their experience with the English monarchy,
the Framers sought
to prevent the war power from being vested solely in
• 73
the Executive. As James Madison put it, "[t]he constitution supposes..
. that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and
most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the
question of war in the Legislature. 7 4 The fact that Pierce Butler's
recommendation that the power to initiate war be vested in the President
received no second indicates the hostility among the Framers to
unilateral, non-defensive war powers." Madison wanted to go even
further; he tried to prevent the President from having a role in
negotiating peace treaties." He feared a President might try to impede
77
peace in order to derive "power and importance from a state of war.,
The Constitution, an otherwise succinct document, is wordy on the
subject of congressional war powers. Therefore, as Hamilton's advocacy
of presidential war powers makes clear, the textual argument for nondefensive, unilateral executive war powers relies on the theory of
inherent executive powers. The constitutional text makes clear that the
Framers rejected that theory as incompatible with both the specific
provisions of the Constitution and the Constitution's general design.
That general design is for a limited federal government, a doctrine which,
as the Tenth Amendment makes clear, applies to both the Legislature
72. One can accept the notion that the President has powers not explicitly delegated
by the Constitution without embracing the theory of inherent executive powers. The
federal government exercises both implied and explicit delegated powers. Id. at 640
(Jackson, J., concurring). See also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 234 (1998).

73. Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison, "[W]e have already given ...one
effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the
Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON,

392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (footnote omitted).

74. James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798, in
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 311, 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). Madison
expressed the same views during his Helvidius/Pacificus exchange with Hamilton: "The

executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence it
is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of its
influence." James Madison, Helvidius No. 4, Sept. 14,1793, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, 171,174 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
75.

FARRAND,

supra note 7, at 318.

76. Id. at 540.
77.

Id. (statement of James Madison).
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and the Executive.
B.

War Powers in the ConstitutionalHistory of the United States

While the Constitution repeatedly and emphatically invests the
legislative body with war power, individual members of Congress and the
body as a whole have been singularly weak-willed in the defense of their
constitutional prerogatives."
As a result, numerous scholars have
developed arguments for the historical development of unilateral
executive authority to initiate and control the decision to introduce the
Armed Forces into hostilities for purposes other than self-defense. The
historical evidence, however, indicates no tension between the

constitutional text and historical practice.
1.

The HistoricalScope of CongressionalWar Powers

In the first decades of its existence, the Supreme Court gave a broad
interpretation to Congress' war powers. In Bas v. Tingy,79 the Justices,
each writing separately, unanimously acknowledged Congress' power to
commit the United States to full-fledged war through a declaration

("perfect war") or to more limited conflicts without a declaration of war
("imperfect war").8 0

Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Talbot v.

78. Congress' response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center is typical.
By a nearly unanimous vote Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President "to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 .... " S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). Barbara Lee, a California
Democrat, cast the one opposing vote, stating "I believe we must make sure that Congress
upholds its responsibilities and upholds checks and balances. This is a representative
democracy, and it's our responsibility." Peter Carlson, The Solitary Vote of Barbara Lee:
Congresswoman Against Use of Force, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at Cl. The subtitle of
the Washington Post's otherwise sympathetic account of Lee's actions is misleading, as
Lee points out that she voted in favor of allocating forty billion dollars to fight terrorism.
Id. Lee is the lone member of Congress to vote against what amounts to a total abdication
of congressional oversight in the realm of war powers. Other members of Congress shared
Lee's views but feared the political ramifications of voting their conscience. See id. ("'I
admire the courage of Barbara Lee,' says Rep. John Lewis .... 'Several other members
wanted to be there also but at the same time, like me, they didn't want to be seen as soft
on terrorism."').
79. 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
80. Justice Washington provides a lengthy discussion of the distinction between
perfect and imperfect war. Id. at 40-41 (Washington, J., concurring). Justice Chase praises
Congress for its "circumspection and prudence" in embarking on a "partial war" with
France. Id. at 45 (Chase, J., concurring). Justice Paterson writes that United States
vessels could engage in war "[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorized the war on our
part." Id. (Paterson, J., concurring). See GLENNON, supra note 41, at 77-78 (commenting
on Bas v. Tingy and other cases decided around the same time as having acknowledged
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Seeman,"' stressed that the Constitution vests in Congress "the whole
powers of war." 2
The extent of congressional war power was first tested during the
Quasi-War with France at the turn of the nineteenth century. Congress
had authorized the President to seize armed French vessels and vessels
sailing to French ports.83
President Adams went beyond that
congressional authorization, however, and ordered the seizure of vessels
sailing to or from French ports.84 When an American ship's captain
seized a vessel coming from a French port pursuant to the executive
orders,85 the owner of the French vessel sued for damages. Holding that
the President could not order such seizures without congressional
authorization, the Supreme Court held the captain liable. 86 This outcome
indicates that once Congress has legislated on an issue involving the use
of force it effectively occupies the field and precludes additional,
unilateral executive action. Therefore, acts of war undertaken on
Executive orders that exceed Congress' explicit authorization are
unlawful.87
Congress can authorize war or the use of force without formally
declaring war.88 As early as the Quasi-War with France, and as recently
as the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War, Congress passed statutes
or resolutions authorizing the President to engage in military
operations. 9 In the alternative, Congress can withhold its consent by
that Congress' power to declare perfect war implies the power to authorize limited or

imperfect war).
81. 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
82. Id. at 28.
83. 1 Stat. 561 (1798); FISHER, PRESIDENTIALWAR POWER, supra note 41, at 18-19.
84. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 178 (1804). See GLENNON, supra note 41, at 3-8
(analyzing Little in its historical context).
85. Little, 6 U.S. at 176.
86. Id. at 179.
87. John Yoo argues that most commentators have misread or overstated the
importance of these early Supreme Court decisions. For Yoo, the Court's statements that
lend support to the position that Congress exercises exclusive power over war are mere
dicta. Yoo, Continuation of Politics,supra note 41, at 294, n.584. However, because I view
the Court's discussion of war powers to have been necessary to its determination of the
outcome of these cases, I disagree with Yoo on this matter.
88. See WORMUTH, supra note 41, at 298-304 (listing statutes authorizing the
President to use the Armed Forces from 1794 through 1956).
89. Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 41, at 177, n.37 (citing the Act of May
28, 1798, Ch. 48, 1 Stat. 56t (France); Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, Pub. L.
No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-672, S. 12 (Jan. 12, 1971)
(Vietnam); Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No.
102-, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (Persian Gulf)). John Hart Ely concludes that Congress
authorized each phase of the Vietnam War by repeatedly authorizing the expansion of the
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passing a statute demanding an end to the use of force; it did so in 1993,
forcing the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from Somalia. 90

In addition, Congress often expresses its approval of presidential
actions by appropriating funds which allow such actions to continue,9' but
such appropriations do not carry the same weight as an explicit
authorization of the use of force." Because Congress must repeatedly
appropriate funds for military actions, 9 Congress can order an end to
these actions by denying appropriations for continuing them, as it did in

conflict. ELY, supra note 41, at 12.
90.
Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87
Stat. 55, 50 U.S.C. §1541, §1544(c) (1994)), the Congress hereby directs the
President to remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by March 31,
1994 (unless the President requests and the Congress authorizes a later date),
except for a limited number of members of the Armed Forces sufficient only to
protect United States diplomatic facilities and citizens, and noncombatant
personnel to advise the United Nations commander in Somalia.
H.R. CON. RES. 170, 103d Cong., 139 CONG. REC. 9039 (1993). For a discussion of the
War Powers Resolution, see text infra accompanying notes 135-46.
91. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 177-81 (1994) (arguing that the power of the purse in
national security is sweeping, though not plenary); Thomas M. Franck & Clifford A. Bob,
The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law after the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 912, 944-48 (1985) (proposing that Congress avail itself of its appropriations
power to achieve the purposes of the War Powers Resolution without violating the
Presentment Clause). Congress can also use its appropriations power to bargain with the
President about foreign policy. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 74-75 (2d ed. 1972). In an argument based on the Coase
Theorem, George Sidak maintains that Congress ought not to express approval of military
actions by appropriating funds for them. See Sidak, supra note 41, at 65 (arguing that
separation of powers can be violated through voluntary exchanges). If Congress approves
of military action, it should either declare war or pass a statute authorizing the action. See
id.
92. In early cases brought during the Vietnam War, courts treated appropriations as
authorizations.
See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Mora v.
McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y.
1970); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Later cases found that concern for
the well-being of soldiers in the field might motivate members of Congress to appropriate
funds for military actions that they opposed. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611
(D.C. Cir 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd for lack
of standing, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). See also, FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 41, at 123-25 (providing historical background to
this line of cases); ELY, supra note 41, at 27-30 (same).
93. For example, Congress appropriated over seven billion dollars for the Vietnam
War in 1965 and 1966. ELY, supra note 41, at 27-28. In addition, Congress appropriated
nearly one billion dollars for Operation Desert Shield. Yoo, Continuation of Politics,
supra note 41, at 297.
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the case of the Vietnam War through the Eagleton Amendment.94
However, Congress generally will not refuse to fund an ongoing military
operation, unless the operation is extremely unpopular at home. Even in
the case of an unpopular operation, Congress will not endanger the
Armed Forces in the field of war by cutting off funding without
warning.9
Such practical considerations can have no effect on the constitutional
allocation of war powers. Advocates of unilateral, non-defensive war
powers often ultimately rely on arguments of expediency. However, if
the Tenth Amendment states a general principle of limited government,
such arguments are unavailing in the face of clear constitutional dictates.
As the foregoing section indicates, the Constitution specifically allocates
numerous war powers to Congress. 96 Congress has consistently exercised
these powers and has never renounced or delegated them.
Consequently, both the constitutional text and constitutional history
dictate that Congress retains the sole power to commit the Armed Forces
to war or to armed conflict short of war.
2.

HistoricalArguments for Executive War Powers

While Presidents often use their power to commit the Armed Forces to
hostilities, the general rule is that they may not do so without
congressional approval. 97 There are, however, important exceptions to
this rule. The President has always had the authority to use the Armed
Forces defensively to repel sudden attacks, and this includes the
authority to order rescues and limited actions to defend United States
interests abroad. In addition, Congress often acquiesces in unilateral
executive action by appropriating funds for such action.
Such
appropriations should not be interpreted as recognizing the legitimacy of
unilateral executive actions. As the Supreme Court pointed out in its
94. 87 Stat. 134 (1973). The Eagleton Amendment states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no
funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to
finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in
and over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia.
Id.
95. The War Powers Resolution thus provides the President a thirty-day window, in
addition to the sixty days the President has to get congressional approval for the use of the
Armed Forces, which she may use to extricate the Armed Forces without endangering the
lives of United States military personnel. War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. §
1544(b) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
96. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl.3.
97. Id.; U.S. Const. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2-3.
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Chadha decision, no amount of institutional impropriety can make an
unconstitutional practice constitutional. 8 As a practical matter, however,

Congress must confront the President in order to challenge Executive
abuses of the war powers and to assert the constitutional right of
Congress to make final decisions regarding the engagement of the
Armed Forces in hostilities.

During the Cold War, advocates of executive war powers argued that
the President as Commander-in-Chief had to be able to respond with
alacrity and in secret to perceived threats to United States security. 99 In
the era of "total war," scholars have developed the notion that Presidents
need to exercise "emergency powers" in order to protect the nation not
only against actual sudden attacks but against the threat of force that
could be used against civilian targets or vital United States interests.lm
But since Presidents have claimed to be exercising emergency powers in
contexts ludicrously far removed from actual national emergencies,, the
notion of emergency powers is not useful. As Justice Jackson put it,

"[the Framers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they
engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
pretext for usurpation.

We may also suspect that they suspected that

98. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[O]ur inquiry is sharpened rather than
blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing
frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies.").
99. In arguing in favor of recognizing the creation of new unilateral, non-defensive
war powers created by the ratification of the U.N. Charter, one Senator pointed to the
changing nature of war, leaving "no time for debates, consultations, and declarations." 91
CONG. REC. 8, 11085 (1945) (statement of Sen. Johnson). The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, in explaining the need for the War Powers Resolution, concluded that
Congress had failed to defend its war powers because of "three decades of almost
uninterrupted crisis in foreign policy."
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
REPORT ON THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 93-220, at 8 (1973), reprinted

in FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 44, at 570, 573. Arguments in favor of presidential
power to authorize pre-emptive strikes are far less compelling in the post Cold-War era.
100. For a critical commentary on this development, see generally Jules Lobel,
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989) (analyzing the
historical expansion of the Executive's emergency power to confront foreign dangers and
arguing that the decline of constitutional constraints on executive power requires means of
limiting emergency powers).
101. With some justification, President Truman declared a national emergency in
response to the Korean conflict. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 19,
1950). Less credibly, Oliver North justified covert aid to Nicaraguan contras based on
vague claims of a nation "at risk" and a "disaster at hand."

JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH
IRAN AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, 100th Cong., 150, 194 (1987) (testimony of
Oliver North).
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There isno
emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies. '
into
its
introduction
and
powers,
emergency
of
constitutional conception
discussions regarding the extent of executive powers is a bit of mischief
that ought not to be entertained. The question is not when the President
can assert emergency powers but when the President can legally exercise
war powers.
The practice of unilateral presidential authorization of the use of
military force is alleged to have emerged in what Justice Jackson
described as a "zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress
"may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain."" 3 In that zone of twilight, congressional quiescence invites or
enables independent presidential action.'O4 But the extent of the zone of
twilight has been overstated. It exists only when Congress is silent. The
President has the power to deploy the Armed Forces offensively without
consulting Congress only if Congress does not object." 5 When Congress
asserts its constitutional war powers, the Executive has no legal power
with which to oppose it because the Constitution does not allocate war
powers of this kind to the President, and the Tenth Amendment
prohibits any branch of the federal government from exercising powers
that are not allocated to it.
There are two types of historical arguments in support of (at times
limited) unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers. Because I am
unconvinced by the best arguments proposing that executive war powers
can be reconciled with the constitutional allocation of powers, I conclude
that these arguments depend implicitly on a theory of inherent executive
authority, a theory that, as I argue in Part III, violates the principle of
limited government articulated in the Tenth Amendment. In this
section, however, the discussion is limited to showing why these historical
arguments fail on their own terms.

102.

Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
103. Id. at 637. (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist followed Justice Jackson's
reasoning in writing for the majority in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660
(1981).

105. HENKIN,
ratification of the
President's actual
CONG. REC. 7992

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 49. During the debates over the
U.N. Charter, Senator Wheeler pointed out the difference between the
power to take the country to war and his legal authority to do so. 91
(1945) (statement of Sen. Wheeler).
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The Quasi-ConstitutionalCustom

Advocates of unilateral, non-defensive war powers point to the
hundreds of instances in which Presidents have authorized the use of

force as establishing a "quasi-constitutional" custom legitimizing such
unilateral, non-defensive war powers.'0 6 Those who make the historical

argument do not rely on the constitutional text but instead argue that the
constitutional allocation of war powers has been amended in practice.
Abraham Sofaer concedes that "Congress clearly has the upper hand
with regard to war, as it controls the means of warmaking, and can
punish Presidents for

disregarding

its instructions." '07

However,

commenting on the President's quasi-constitutional war powers, Harold
Koh, who is not an advocate of unilateral, non-defensive war powers,
concludes that although the Constitution "gives Congress almost all of
the enumerated powers over foreign affairs," while giving the President
very few, Presidents traditionally have seized the initiative in foreign

affairs.08 Most defenses of executive power are thus based on a review of
the history
of unilateral executive decision-making regarding peace and
109
war.
The strategy is one of obscuring the "is" and the "ought" or, more

precisely, of arguing that because Presidents have often taken the
106. See KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 41, at 67-1.00 (discussing the
development of the quasi-constitutional custom of unilateral, non-defensive war powers).
Louis Fisher notes that unilateral presidential military initiatives consist largely of "fights
with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts,
the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican
border, and the like." Fisher, Unchecked Wars, supra note 42, at 1655-56 (quoting Edward
S. Corwin, The President'sPower,in NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29,1951, at 15, 16).
107. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33, 35 (1995).
Sofaer points out that the President's power over foreign affairs allows him to lead the
nation into conflicts or even to cause war. Id.
108. Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292-93 (1988). See also John Yoo,
Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169,
1179 (1999). Yoo argues that:
The President has taken the primary role in deciding when and how to initiate
hostilities. Congress has allowed the executive branch to assume the leadership
and initiative in war, and instead has assumed the role of approving military
actions after the fact by declarations of support and by appropriations.
Throughout courts have invoked the political question doctrine to avoid
interfering in war powers questions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. One of the best-developed arguments is that of Abraham Sofaer: ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976).
Sofaer's arguments focus on the first thirty years of United States history. Others follow
the same general approach and bring it forward into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Yoo,
Kosovo, supra note 42, at 1676-85 (noting that Presidents have, since World War II, begun
sending the Armed Forces into major conflicts without congressional authorization).
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initiative in committing the Armed Forces to conflicts, the Executive has
the legal authority to do so. But the argument from history has to be
more rigorous than that. Otherwise any illegitimate practice could
become legitimate through repetition. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
in the Steel Seizure Case"' establishes a three-part test for the legitimate
expansion of executive powers.'' First, the practice by the Executive
must be systematic, unbroken, and long pursued." 2 Second, Congress
must knowingly acquiesce in the practice." 3 Third, the Executive may
14
not violate any unambiguous constitutional commands or statutes.'
The historical argument fails because none of these prongs is satisfied.
The history of unilateral executive action in the early Republic is not
pretty. Presidents act pursuant to vague congressional authorizations.
Congress responds limply, either finding the presidential action
authorized under some statute ' 5 or, if no statute is handy, affording the
President ex-post-facto relief by retroactively approving his actions and
passing appropriate measures.' 6 However, both the early Presidents and
the Congress knew when they danced around the Constitution in this
manner that presidential military escapades undertaken pursuant to
Executive orders require congressional approval and authorization.
Early Presidents were sufficiently in tune with the sentiments of the
110. Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J.,
concurring).
111. Frankfurter stated that:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on "executive
Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.
concurring); see also KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY, supra
Id. at 610-1.1 (Frankfurter, J.,
note 41, at 70-71.
112. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

concurring).
113. Id. (Frankfurter, J.,
114. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Raven-Hansen, supra note 52, at 32.
115. Sometimes Congress had to interpret statutes creatively in order to read them as
justifying presidential action. For example, a House committee investigating President
Monroe's authorization of the occupation of Amelia Island in order to oust a group that
had taken control of the island and established it as a center for piracy and slave trade,
concluded that Monroe's actions were justified by a law prohibiting the importation of
slaves and by the No-Transfer Act. Sofaer, Power Over War, supra note 107, at 46.
116. For a different take on the history of war powers in the early Republic, see David
P. Currie, Rumors of War: Presidentialand Congressional War Powers, 1809-1829, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (2000) (reviewing, based on primary source materials, the history of what
he calls "a number of brushfires short of outright war" during the Presidencies of James
Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, and concluding that these Presidents
neither sought nor exercised unilateral war powers).
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majority of United States citizens that they never engaged the military in
a way that aroused concerted opposition. However, the fact that
Congress approved of executive actions does not mean that Congress
thereby relinquished its power to block unilateral executive action of
which it disapproved.
Historical studies of the allocation of war powers in the early Republic
demonstrate that both Congress and the early Presidents recognized that
Congress alone had the constitutional power to authorize war. Abraham
Sofaer, for example, argues that George Washington consulted only with
his cabinet before taking decisions that could have resulted in war.'1 7
According to Sofaer, Congress allowed Washington to take the lead in
planning the foreign and military affairs of the nation."" But Sofaer's
narrative actually reveals that Washington acted in consultation with
Congress and that he ordered the engagement of the military only
pursuant to congressional legislation.119
As early as 1793, when the Governor of Georgia asked President
Washington to send United States troops to intervene in border
skirmishes between frontier settlers and Indians, Washington declined,
explaining that "no offensive expedition of importance" could be taken
without congressional authorization.
Washington's Secretary of War
warned territorial governors that military operations were confined to
defensive measures unless Congress decided otherwise, ' because
Congress alone was "vested with the powers of War"'122 and Congress
alone was "competent to decide upon an offensive war ....
,,3 There can
be no doubt that President Washington understood the limitations of the
constitutional grant of executive war powers.
Sofaer next claims that "Presidential use of military force increased

117. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 109, at 101-06.
118. Sofaer, Power Over War, supra note 107, at 40. Harold Koh notes that
Washington's most controversial decision was the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793. KOH,
NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 41, at 78. That proclamation provoked the celebrated
Pacificus/Helvidius debate between Hamilton and Madison, but, as a practical matter,
Washington's decision had "overwhelming congressional support." Id. at 79.
119. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 109, at 120-27.
120. Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
121. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 195 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936).
122. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Nov. 26, 1792), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 221 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936).
123. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Mar. 23, 1795), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 389 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936).
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1 4
substantially under Jefferson and his Republican successors. 1
However, Sofaer also acknowledges that Jefferson "avoided measures
that would have committed the nation to war.",115 In fact, Jefferson's
understanding of war powers was no different from that of Washington.
For example, Jefferson explained to Congress that an American Navy
captain had disabled a Tripolitan pirate ship but had released the
captured pirates because the Navy was not authorized to take nondefensive measures without the sanction of Congress.126
James Madison took provocative actions in western Florida,
proclaiming the area west of the Pearl River to be part of the Orleans
Territory and directing that territory's governor to take possession of the
region on behalf of the United States.'27 His actions could have provoked
war with Spain, but Henry Clay defended the President's actions,
pointing out that Congress had in 1803 1"provided
for the occupation of
28
the entire territory purchased from France. Madison was thus merely
executing the laws of Congress."' Whether or not Madison was correct
in interpreting the reach of the Orleans Territory, neither he nor his
supporters in Congress ever claimed that the President had unilateral
authority to initiate hostilities in the interests of territorial expansion
without congressional approval. 30
The annexation of west Florida was complete by 1812, but by the end
of that same decade, the United States military was engaged in east
Florida. 3'
During James Monroe's presidency, Andrew Jackson
launched a series of unauthorized attacks on the Seminole Indians in
Florida, and Jackson then proceeded to attack Spanish forts when the
Spanish proved unable to control the Seminoles in their territory. 132 A
debate over war powers ensued in the House of Representatives, but the
House rejected all measures aimed at censuring the administration for its
conduct. The Senate, while condemning Jackson for exceeding his

124.

Sofaer, Power Over War, supra note 107, at 43.

125. Id.
126. Jefferson, First Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1801, reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, at 326-32 (James D. Richardson ed.,

1903).
127. James

Madison,

Proclamation of October 27, 1810, reprinted in

1

A

COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, at 480-81 (James D.

Richardson ed., 1903).
128. Currie, supra note 116, at 9.
129. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 6162 (1810) (statement of Sen. Clay).

130. Currie, supra note 116, at 10.
131. Id. at 11.
132.

[d. at 12.
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authority, took no action, and John Quincy Adams went so far as to
praise Jackson for having made possible a long-sought treaty with
Spain.133 But Monroe reprimanded Jackson for exceeding his orders,
reminding him that attacking the Spanish forts was an act of war to which
the President was not competent.'34 Even Jackson's supporters agreed
that neither he nor the President had the legal authority to initiate war
against Spain; they merely contended that the occupation of Spanish
forts was an act of necessity in the face of the Seminole threat.'35
Sofaer contends that Presidents exercised "concurrent authority to act
in ways that could cause war."' 36 They did so, however, in a defensive
capacity - "protecting American nationals from Indians, or protecting
American vessels from piratical activities." '37 In the first forty years of
United States history, Presidents exercised the limited defensive war
powers allocated to them in the constitutional system. Even when using
this power, the early Presidents sought to work within guidelines
established by congressional acts. Thus, after surveying the campaign
against Caribbean piracy during the Monroe Administration, Sofaer
concludes:
At no point during the first forty years of activity under the
Constitution, did a President or any other important participant
claim that Presidents could exercise force independently of
congressional control. In fact, Congress demonstrated its
capacity to control the President's use of force by delineating
how and where force could be used during the Quasi-War with
France, and by denying Monroe
authority to use force to seize
38
East Florida from Spain.

David Currie concludes more pointedly that:
[T]he express position of every President to address [war
powers] during the first forty years of the present Constitution
was entirely in line with that proclaimed by Congress in the War
Powers Resolution in 1973: The President may introduce troops
into hostilities only pursuant to a congressional declaration of

133. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 109, at 343-65.

134. Letter from James Monroe to Andrew Jackson (July 19, 1818), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 58-59 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1900).
135. See Currie, supra note 116, at 14-15 (summarizing the arguments made by
Jackson's supporters).
136. Sofaer, Power Over War, supra note 107, at 51.
137. Id. From a contemporary perspective, we would want to question the extent to
which these military activities could be accurately described as "defensive." At the time,
however, the characterization was not susceptible to dispute.
138. Id. at 50-51.
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Although Congress continued to acquiesce in the unilateral exercise of
executive war powers throughout the nineteenth century, Presidents
continued to seek congressional authorization for their actions, and
Congress continued to demand, even if only after the fact, that its war
powers be respected. 4 ° Thus, before declaring war on Mexico, Congress
first censured President Polk for provoking the clash that made the
declaration of war necessary.' 4' President Lincoln consciously exceeded
his war powers at the beginning of the Civil War when he blockaded the
seceding states and suspended the writ of habeas corpus while Congress
was in recess. 14 Knowing that he acted without constitutional authority,
Lincoln requested that Congress ratify his actions, and it did so
retroactively. 41 While acknowledging that Lincoln had authority to take
military action in a civil war, the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases of
1863 made clear that the President "has no power to initiate or declare
war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State."' 4" The executive
branch took the same position, stating at oral argument that "the right to
as a voluntary act of sovereignty" is vested solely in
initiate a 14war,
5
Congress.
In sum, a review of the early history of the United States reveals that
the early Presidents recognized that they could only legitimately exercise
war powers in defending the United States against attacks on its
territory, its possessions, or the Armed Forces. While early Presidents
never acknowledged the Tenth Amendment as the source of that
limitation, their understanding of the Constitution was entirely consistent
with the interpretation provided here: the Constitution explicitly
allocates the vast majority of war powers to Congress; such an allocation
cannot be altered without violating the principles of limited government

139. Currie, supra note 116, at 1.
140. See generally FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 41, at 13-44;
Stromseth, UnderstandingConstitutionalWar Powers, supra note 41, at 866-68.
141. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 41, at 31-34.
142. Id. at 38-39.
143. Id. John Hart Ely distinguishes domestic rebellion from war and argues that

Lincoln therefore did not need to invoke Presidential war powers in taking action against
the South. The President has authority under Article 11to "take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed," and Congress had passed acts in 1795 and 1807 empowering the
President to use the military to suppress insurrections. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress
Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379,1390 n.34 (1988).
144. 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863).

145. Id. at 660.
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embodied in the Tenth Amendment. Only in the second half of the
twentieth century have Presidents begun to claim authority to engage the
military in non-defensive situations without congressional authorization.
In doing so, the Presidents do not build upon existing historical
precedents. To the extent that modern Presidents arrogate to themselves
powers allocated to another branch of the federal government, they
undermine the principle of limited government and violate the
Constitution.
b.

The War Powers Resolution

The Executive and Legislature have struggled over the proper
allocation of war powers for the past two centuries. 46 This struggle
responds to developments such as the changing nature of warfare and the
rise of collective security regimes. The War Powers Resolution of 1973
(the Resolution), 47 passed in response to the perceived expansion of
presidential war powers during the Vietnam War,
constitutes an
important chapter in the history of that struggle and provides further
evidence that Congress has never relinquished its constitutional war
powers. The Resolution purports to "insure that the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President" will apply to decisions involving
the use of force. 149 The Resolution calls upon the President to "consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated."'"5
If Congress does not either declare war or
specifically authorize the use of the Armed Forces within sixty days of
146. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957,
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION, 171 (4th ed. 1957) ("[T]he

Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the
issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.").
147. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
148. ELY, supra note 41, at 48; ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY xi (1991). The

Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted, "The transfer from Congress to the executive
of the actual power -- as distinguished from the constitutional authority -- to initiate war
has been one of the most remarkable developments in the constitutional history of the
United States."

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITrEE REPORT ON THE WAR

POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 99, at 14.
149. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (a)(1994).
150. War Powers Resolution § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994). This consultation is to take
the form of a written report, submitted to Congress within forty-eight hours of any
introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities in the absence of a declaration of war. War
Powers Resolution § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1994). The President is also obligated to
report to Congress at least once every six months for the duration of the United States'
involvement in the hostilities. War Powers Resolution § 4(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) (1994).
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the onset of hostilities, the President must terminate the use of the
Armed Forces in the context reported upon. ' In the twenty-five years
since the enactment of the Resolution, however, Presidents, with
increasing frequency, have introduced the Armed Forces into hostilities
without consulting Congress."' They have done so either because they
do not consider the actions they have taken to be covered by the
Resolution or because they reject the Resolution as an unconstitutional
encroachment on their war powers."'

Although critics argue that the Resolution violates the separation of
powers, the terms in which this argument is made reveal not only the
constitutionality of the Resolution but also the need for it. Eugene
Rostow, for example, argues that, "[t]here are times . . . when the
' 4

President should not report to Congress or, indeed, to anyone else."'
While it is true that the President sometimes has to authorize the use of
force in order to defend the United States against sudden attacks, there is
no situation in which the President would be justified in not reporting
such a use of force to the full Congress. If Presidents believe Rostow's
words, then the Resolution provides a critical mechanism for compelling
them to consult with Congress and for guiding congressional checks on
executive abuses of power.'5 5

151. War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. §1544(b) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). The
statute allows the President an additional thirty days to extricate United States troops
safely from the theater of war. Id.
152. In order to avoiding triggering the Resolution's sixty-day grace period, Presidents
have issued reports "consistent with" rather than "pursuant to" the Resolution. See Fisher
& Adler, supra note 41, at 11;Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 42, at 181-82. Six
such reports are reprinted in FRANCK AND GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra
note 44, at 591-98. When Presidents have made reports pursuant to the Resolution, they
do so only after the military operations have been completed. Ellen Collier, Statutory
Constraints: The War Powers Resolution, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER
TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVEs 55, 61 (Gary M. Stern &
Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
153. The Resolution was passed over President Nixon's veto, and no President has
openly acknowledged its constitutionality. Nixon's veto message is reprinted in FRANCK
& GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 44, at 567-70. Scholarly works
calling for the repeal of the Resolution include: ELY, supra note 41, at 132-38 (proposing
revisions of the existing Resolution); TURNER, supra note 148, Fisher & Adler, supra note
41; Ely, War Powers that Worked, supra note 143 (proposing an alternative War Power
Resolution); Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 17, 18 (1995). Members of Congress have also called for the repeal or
revision of the Resolution. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The War
Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A "JointDecision" Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367 (1988).
154. Charles J. Cooper, supra note 66, at 195 (comments of Eugene V. Rostow).
155. A second argument against the Resolution is that its provision enabling Congress
to order the President to remove the Armed Forces from theaters of war by concurrent
resolution, War Powers Resolution § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1994), may violate the
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Liberal critics of the Resolution view the Resolution as a failure, as it
has done nothing to reverse the expansion of unilateral executive war
powers.'
Liberals object not to the constitutionality of the Resolution
but to its efficacy. By empowering the President to commit the Armed

Forces to hostilities for sixty days without congressional authorization,
the Resolution seems to give legislative approval to the President's

power to take the country to war.'57 If the President, acting without
congressional consent, can lawfully commit the Armed Forces to
hostilities for sixty or ninety days, one reasonably may inquire into the
basis for imposing any restrictions on the presidential war powers. The

Resolution can thus be read to give explicit statutory approval to
unilateral presidential war powers.158
These criticisms ignore provisions of the Resolution that establish clear

guidelines for the limitation of presidential war powers. The President
can only exercise these powers pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
an attack on the United States, its territories, its possessions, or its
Armed Forces.'59 Notwithstanding the sixty to ninety-day grace period
Presentment Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
the Court struck down the legislative veto provision in § 244(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, because the Constitution permits legislation to be passed only by a
majority of both houses and presentment to the President. Id. at 956-59. The legislative
veto was held to violate that constitutional requirement. Id. at 959; see also Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), afftg, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (striking down a provision of the Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980 that provided for Congressional disapproval by concurrent
resolution). However, John Hart Ely has persuasively argued that section 5(c) could
survive Chadha, because it does not provide for a legislative veto but, taken together with
sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) of the Resolution, approximates the intentions of the Framers,
obligating the President to cease military activities if Congress does not approve. ELY,
supra note 41, at 119.
156. ELY, supra note 41, at 48-49; GLENNON, supra note 41, at 94.
157. Fisher & Adler, supra note 41, at I ("The resolution ... grants to the president
unbridled discretion to go to war as he deems necessary against anyone, anytime,
anywhere, for at least ninety days.").
158. Id. ("As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has observed, before 'the passage of the
resolution, unilateral presidential war was a matter of usurpation. Now, at least for the
first ninety days, it was a matter of law."') (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 434-35 (1989)).

159. War Powers Resolution § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1994). Ely criticizes this
provision of the statute as merely hortatory and suggests that it might be improved if it
could be made legally binding on the President. ELY, supra note 41, at 117. Ely ultimately
finds this solution inadequate, however, and recommends the repeal of § 2(c). Id. Ely and
others point out that section 2(c) unlawfully limits presidential war powers, since it does
not allow for presidential action to protect American citizens abroad. Id. at 117-118;
TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 148, at 109. 1 agree
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created by the statute, the Resolution is powerless to prevent Congress
from exercising its constitutional war powers and demanding the removal
of the Armed Forces from any theater of war. The Resolution provides
statutory authorization for the President's defensive war powers, but
those powers remain circumscribed by congressional war powers. The
Resolution thus preserves the constitutional allocation of power, and
clarifies congressional power, by providing guidelines which circumscribe
the President's options for unilateral action to those within the scope of
her traditional defensive war powers.
Whenever the President contemplates committing the Armed Forces
to hostilities, she has an obligation to consult with Congress. The
President's obligation to Congress does not depend on the size of the
intervention or the chances of escalation. Although Congress has
generally acquiesced in the President's unilateral power to commit the
Armed Forces to actions of limited scope, that acquiescence in individual
cases, no matter how numerous, cannot result in a transfer of war powers
from one branch of the federal government to another. Although the
President may act unilaterally in order to repel sudden attacks, the
Framers intended for the Legislature alone to authorize the deployment
of the Armed Forces in all other contexts. The Resolution appropriately
requires that the President report to Congress even when exercising her
traditional defensive war powers.
In conclusion, the historical arguments fail to satisfy any of the three
prongs of Justice Frankfurter's test for the legitimate expansion of
executive powers. Outside of the context of national self-defense, the
President has no constitutional authority to engage the Armed Forces
without congressional consent. As the foregoing discussion of the quasiconstitutional custom indicates, Congress has either lent legitimacy to
presidential action by passing authorizing legislation or by appropriating
funds, or it has expressed its disapproval of unilateral executive action.
Congress rarely chooses the latter route, however, in part because courts
have been timid in supporting Congress in its attempt to protect its
constitutional war powers, and in part because politicians are reluctant to
appear to undercut the Armed Forces while they are engaged in combat.
Nonetheless, the historical evidence is insufficient to support the
argument that, because Presidents have repeatedly engaged the military
without consulting with the Congress, the Executive is now endowed
and would preserve the Resolution but amend it so as not to interfere with the President's
traditional authority to protect American citizens abroad. But the criticism is irrelevant,
as the Resolution could do nothing to alter the President's long-recognized power to repel
sudden attacks, which includes the power to use the Armed Forces to protect U.S. citizens.
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with non-defensive constitutional war powers. There simply is no
systematic, unbroken, and long-standing tradition of non-defensive,
unilateral executive war powers.' 6°
Therefore, the first prong of
Frankfurter's test is not met.
The Resolution demonstrates that the second and third prongs of
Frankfurter's test also are not met. 16 1 Congress has not acquiesced in
unilateral executive authorization of the use of force; rather Congress has
enacted legislation to protect its own war powers. By limiting the
President's power to use military force to three enumerated situations,
the Resolution expresses the clear command of Article I of the
Constitution, which vests in the legislative branch the power to commit
the Armed Forces to hostilities. Although Presidents frequently have
engaged the Armed Forces on their own initiative, they have either done
so in defensive contexts or they have acknowledged Congress' ultimate
power to authorize the use of force. As none of the three prongs of
Frankfurter's test are met, unilateral, non-defensive war powers cannot
be established by means of the argument based on quasi-constitutional
custom absent some theory of inherent executive power.
c.

Collective Security and War Powers

Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel have suggested that the United
Nations Charter (Charter) serves as a specific authorization for the
exercise of unilateral, non-defensive executive war powers in the context
of United Nations-authorized police actions. 162 David Golove, while not
persuaded by the Franck/Patel account, provides a sophisticated defense
of parts of it based on Bruce Ackerman's theory of informal
constitutional amendments.16 Golove argues "that the adoption of the
Charter constituted a decisive act of popular sovereignty that
' 64
transformed the constitutional understanding of the war powers.
Golove thus "affirm[s] the President's unilateral power to use armed
force in United Nations collective security actions.' ' 65 If these scholars
160. See text, supra, accompanying note 101.
161. See text, supra, accompanying notes 102-03.
162. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Thomas M. Franck, Declare War? Congress
Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A27.
163. David

Golove,

From

Versailles to

San Francisco: The

Revolutionary

Transformation of War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491, 1522 n.117 (1999) (citing 1
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991));
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).

see also 2 BRUCE

164. Id. at 1492.
165. Id. Golove then provides three limitations to that unilateral Presidential
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are correct, United States participation in collective security agreements
effects a massive expansion of presidential war powers, since the United
States increasingly deploys its military through participation in collective
security measures. If the President can authorize such participation
without first obtaining congressional authorization, the President can
bypass congressional war powers on almost any occasion on which she
might want to commit the Armed Forces to hostilities.
Part of the attraction of these arguments is that they facilitate United
States participation in international peacekeeping operations while
rejecting unilateral executive power to initiate war outside of the context
of such operations.'6 According to these historico-theoretical arguments,
Congress has delegated its war powers through ratifying and
implementing collective security agreements.
Rather than merely
providing retrospective authorization for unilateral presidential actions,
as Congress has in the past, by approving collective security
arrangements, Congress has granted Presidents prospective authorization
to engage the Armed Forces without first seeking specific congressional
authorization. While it is not clear that the Constitution allows for such a
delegation, no such delegation has occurred. Congressional war powers
apply to United States participation in international police actions just as
they apply to unilateral uses of the Armed Forces.
Franck and Patel offer a teleological interpretation of the Constitution
that focuses on the Framers' aim of providing for an institutional check
on executive power. The Framers were concerned that the decision to
take the country to war should not rest with a single person, and within
the domestic context the Framers imagined Congress was to provide the
authority:
First, it does not extend to large-scale commitments of the armed forces of the
United States in major military actions ....

Second, the President's authority is

always subject to ultimate congressional control.
Congress can adopt a
resolution prohibiting him from participating in a particular United Nations
action or generally in any United Nations action. Third, I do not premise the
President's authority on a general power to make "little" wars.
Id. at 1492-93.
166. John Yoo is at a loss to explain why international legal scholars, who protested
previous unilateral attempts by Presidents to commit the Armed Forces to collective
security operations, had not objected to United States military intervention in Kosovo.
John Yoo, The Dogs that Didn't Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on
Kosovo?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 149, 155 (2000). Because Yoo's article ignores the positions
discussed in this section, he exaggerates the uniformity with which international legal
scholars have denounced unilateral presidential authorization of United States
participation in collective security operations. Let there be no ambiguity here, however, I
agree with Yoo that NATO intervention in Kosovo "violated the U.N. Charter and,
hence, international law." Id.
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check on executive power."' But, Franck and Patel insist, the nature of
war has been transformed by the advent of collective security regimes.
When countries unite their armed forces in collective security measures,
their aim is not warfare but the restoration of peace and security."' In
that context, Franck and Patel maintain, the multiple checks on the
power of the President created by the Security Council are sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional demand that there be checks on the power of
the President to initiate aggressive war. " ° Any of the five permanent
members of the Security Council can block unilateral executive action
through the exercise of its veto. 171
This teleological reading of the Constitution would make available to
the Executive an alternative route to war: if the President cannot get
Congress to authorize armed conflict, she can go to the Security Council
and get authorization. But the Senate has expressly rejected the notion
that a Security Council resolution can provide the President with
authorization to commit the Armed Forces to collective security
measures in the absence of congressional authorization."' Franck and
Patel respond by pointing out that, in giving its approval to the
ratification of the Charter, the Senate concluded that the Security
Council does not provide an alternative route to war but replaces war
with collective security: "Preventive or enforcement actions by these
forces under the order of the Security Council would not be an act of war
but would be international action for the preservation of peace and for
Accordingly, United States
the purpose of preventing war. ', 171
participation in collective security simply does not implicate
congressional war powers.
Franck and Patel's argument fails for the simple reason that the
distinction between war and collective security has no validity as a matter
of constitutional law.174 At the urging of the Truman administration,
167. Franck & Patel, supra note 162, at 74.
168. Id.at 63.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 72-74.
171. Id. at 74; U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para.3.
172. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,415-33 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994) (rejecting, by a vote of
100 to zero, the claim that Security Council Resolution 940, authorizing measures to
restore international peace and security in Haiti, rendered unnecessary congressional
approval of the commitment of the Armed Forces to such measures).
173. 91 CONG REc. 10,968 (statement of Sen. Connally) (quoting S. EXEC. REP. No.
8, at 9 (1945)). This language is quoted approvingly in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee Report on the United Nations Participation Act, H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 7-8
(1945).
174. Raven-Hansen, supra note 52, at 40.
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some Senators seemed to accept the distinction during discussions of the
ratification of the United Nations Charter. In the decades since the
ratification of the Charter, however, Congress has repeatedly rejected
the distinction. The Security Council may not declare war, but, as the
Persian Gulf War indicates, it can authorize collective security measures
on a scale akin to that of war. Still, Congress has never recognized the
authority of the Executive to authorize the Security Council to commit
the Armed Forces to such security measures.
Furthermore, the Security Council consists of representatives of the
executives of its member states. The Charter thus provides for no check
on the power of the executives of the world to embroil their states in war
or something very close to war. The Constitution does not contemplate
that the entirety of the war power could be entrusted to an executive
body such as the Security Council, even if that Council provides for the
executive branches of numerous countries to serve as checks on the
others' power to declare war. No Framer would have supported the
commitment of United States troops to a collective security measure
declared necessary by George Washington, in consultation with George
III, Napoleon, Tsar Alexander, and Metternich.
Franck and Patel argue that, regardless of what the Framers wished,
Congress delegated powers over collective security to the President when
they consented to the ratification of the Charter.7 Although Franck and
Patel admirably annotate their argument with references to the
Congressional Record, the Senators to whom they cite do not have the
authority, merely by speaking in favor of a treaty, to revoke for all time
Congress' traditional war powers. One point of the allocation of the vast
majority of war powers to the legislative branch was to make it difficult
to put the country at war, 1 6 and although Franck and Patel do not think
of collective security measures as war, they are, in fact, the way the
United States makes war today. Because the alternative method of
committing the Armed Forces to hostilities advocated by Franck and
Patel is incompatible with the constitutional allocation of war powers, it
cannot provide a basis for unilateral, non-defensive executive war
powers.
David Golove provides a more detailed discussion of how Congress is
175.
176.

Frank & Patel, supra note 162, at 74.
1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 7, at 316. (quoting James Madison as saying

war was "among the greatest of national calamities"). The Framers sought to reduce the
likelihood of such calamities befalling the nation by requiring that the people's
representatives be consulted in decisions to commit the Armed Forces to hostilities. See
supra, text accompanying notes 45-7 1.

20011

The Tenth Amendment and the Executive War Power

supposed to have delegated its war powers to the President and the
Security Council. Professor Golove claims that the allocation of war
powers was re-negotiated in response to the failure of the Versailles
Treaty.17 7 Golove's work draws on Bruce Ackerman's theory of higher
lawmaking and informal constitutional amendments.' 78 In an earlier
essay on NAFTA, Ackerman and Golove argue that the Constitution
may provide textual support for unilateral executive authority to
negotiate trade instruments. 9 Even in the absence of such textual
support, however, Ackerman and Golove claim that a post-war
constitutional transformation legitimated the practice of unilateral
executive trade agreements."8
Extending the argument about treaties
into the realm of war powers, Golove contends that the advocates of
collective security also established a national consensus in favor of
unilateral executive power in order to facilitate cooperation in

international regimes.' Golove argues that the adoption of the Charter
transformed the constitutional understanding of war powers.'82 In the
aftermath of World War II, Golove argues, Congress retained its
"exclusive power over large scale conflicts," but "allow[ed] the President
scope for unilateral action when cooperating with the United Nations."'8 3
Golove's theory focuses on the Senate's vote to grant its advice and
177. Golove, supranote 163, at 1495-96.
178. ACKERMAN, supra note 163.

179. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 813-45 (1995). For Tribe's criticisms of this argument, see Lawrence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1228-35 (1995) (criticizing Golove and
Ackerman's analysis).
180. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 179, at 813-45. Golove summarizes part of the
argument as follows:
With public opinion mobilized against it, a constitutional amendment [that would
strip the Senate of its treaty power] pending, and the Roosevelt Administration
threatening an end-run around it, the Senate blinked. It accepted the
constitutional validity of the congressional-executive agreement as an alternative
to the treaty procedure and proceeded to approve a host of important
agreements, including the Bretton Woods Agreements, as congressionalexecutive agreements.
Golove, supra note 163, at 1497. Michael Ramsey argues that, while the Constitution
does empower the President to undertake international obligations, this power is limited
in two respects. Michael D. Ramesey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power,
77 N.C.L. REV. 133, 136 (1998). "First, it extend[s] only to minor, short term agreements."
Id. Second, international obligations undertaken by the President alone are not binding
law in the domestic context until implemented through domestic legislation. Id. at 136-37.
181. Golove, supra note 163, at 1507-20.
182. Id. at 1520.
183. Id.
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consent to the ratification of the Charter and the passage of the United
Nations Participation Act (UNPA),' which implemented the Charter in
part and made it binding as domestic law. Chapter VII of the Charter
empowers the Security Council to declare the existence of a threat to
international peace and security.1 5 Having made such a declaration, and
having exhausted peaceful measures, the Security Council can pass a
resolution pursuant to Article Forty-two of the Charter authorizing "such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security.' ' . 6 The Charter attempts to
provide for such forces through Article Forty-three, which obligates
members of the United Nations to enter into special agreements that
designate certain national armed forces to be used in Article Forty-two
enforcement actions.'87 In the UNPA, Congress approved in principle
the idea of entering into a special agreement with the United Nations
pursuant to Article Forty-three, committing the United States to
contribute to a permanent United Nations force.8 8 For Golove, the
approval of the UNPA signals "a transfer of war powers from Congress
to the Executive, because the United States delegate to the Security
Council would be the representative of the Executive, not of
Congress."'' 9
But Golove is unable to show that any actual delegation ever took
place. Although Congress authorized the President to negotiate an
Article Forty-three agreement, the United States never actually entered
into such an agreement (nor did any other United Nation member state),

184. 22 U.S.C. § 287d (1994).
185. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore peace and security.").

186. UN CHARTER art. 42.
187. UN CHARTER art. 43, para. I (providing that all U.N. members shall enter into
special agreements according to which they will make available to the Security Council

armed forces, assistance, and facilities necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security).
188. 22 U.S.C. § 287d (1994). Section 287d provides:
The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with
the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of Congress . ..
providing for the number and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness

and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights
of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with

article 43 of said Charter.
189. Golove, supra note 163, at 1500.
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and thus no delegation of war powers took place. 9 ° In any case, as I have
argued elsewhere, the UNPA would have effected only a specific and
limited delegation of war powers from the Congress to the Executive.'9 '
In the context of their discussion of Article Forty-three special
agreements, the Senators made clear their conviction that the Charter
should not be viewed as a blank check, granting the President limitless
authority to commit the Armed Forces to the Security Council without
congressional approval. 92
Far from indicating a revolutionary
transformation in the Senate's understanding of war powers, the debates
on the Charter indicate that the Senate considered only a limited
expansion of the President's traditional defensive war powers. The
numbers contemplated in the 1949 amendment to the UNPA indicate
that Congress may have considered a commitment under Article Fortythree that consisted of little more than a lightly-armed police force.'93
Moreover, as Golove notes, Congress could at any time undo the
commitment it made through the UNPA, either with regard to specific
United Nations authorized police actions, or globally, with respect to all
actions authorized by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VIL' 94
Even if one is convinced by the theory of informal constitutional
amendment in general, the history of United States' participation in
collective security regimes does not support Golove's claim of a
revolutionary transformation in the allocation of war powers. First, the
190. Negotiations among the permanent members of the Security Council to conclude
Article forty-three agreements were fruitless. Id. at 1501 (citing U.N. Doc. S/394 (1947)).
Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 464
(1991).
191. D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Instance of Collective Security Regimes, in
DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND

SOVEREIGNTY 133 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000).
192. Speaking of Article forty-three agreements, Senator Vandenberg stated, "we all
agree that this cannot be done by executive agreement if it eliminates the voice of
Congress or the voice of the Senate from the equation." 91 CONG. REC. 8000 (1945)
(statements of Sen. Vandenberg). Vandenberg repeated the same point the following day.
91 CONG. REc. 8028 (1945) (statements of Sen. Vandenberg).
193. 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1 (1) (1994). The 1949 amendment to the UNPA permits the
President to provide forces to the United Nations for "cooperative action" provided that:
1) the United States forces serve only as observers, guards, or in a noncombatant capacity;
and 2) no more than 1000 such personnel be detailed at any one time. Id. Golove points
to the much more significant commitment that the United States contemplated during the
fruitless negotiations at the United Nations that sought to hammer out the terms of Article
forty-three agreements. Golove, supra note 163, at 1503, n.41. It is hard to know how
much weight to give to the negotiating position adopted by the executive branch, however,
because the 1949 amendment to the UNPA indicates that Congress would not have
accepted such a large-scale commitment of United States forces to the Security Council.
194. See supra note 165.
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Senate's overwhelming vote in support of granting its advice and consent
to the ratification of the Charter should not be mistaken for a specific
approval of each of its provisions.1 95 Following the debacle of the
Versailles Treaty, the Senate concluded that the imperfect Charter was
far preferable to no charter at all. Second, even if the Senate was
enthusiastic about United States' participation in United Nations'
authorized collective security measures in 1945, that enthusiasm found
little expression in subsequent practice. As Golove acknowledges,
Article Forty-three, the core of the Charter's collective security regime,
fell victim to the Cold War. 9 6 At most, Golove has shown that Congress
was willing in 1.945 to consider a specific delegation of some part of its
war powers to the President for the purposes of United States'
participation in United Nations' authorized police actions pursuant to
Articles Forty-two and Forty-three of the Charter. In the absence of an
Article Forty-three agreement, however, the delegation never was
consummated.
Professor Golove believes that he has chronicled a constitutional
transformation; he seems to have chronicled only a public relations coup.
He sets the stage by telling the sad tale of the demise of the League of
Nations due to the crippling isolationism of a few Senators.' 97 He then
recounts a "vast political movement" organized by internationalists. 98
Public opinion shifted in the 1940s towards favorable views of United
States participation in international organizations. Golove credits the
"energetic efforts" of the internationalist camp with bringing about this
sea-change in American views. 9 9 Golove also praises President
Roosevelt's "impeccable sense of political timing" in recounting the
administration's efforts to dampen public awareness of potential
195. 91 CONG. REC. 8190 (1945). The Senate gave its advice and consent to the
Charter by a vote of eighty-nine to two. Id.
196. Golove, supra note 163, at 1501. The differences between Ackerman and
Golove's persuasive arguments on behalf of NAFTA's constitutionality and Golove's less
compelling arguments on behalf of unilateral executive war powers are clear. There is a
long-standing practice of congressional-executive agreements in the economic realm.
According to Golove, over ninety percent of our agreements since World War II have
been concluded in the form of congressional-executive agreements. David Golove,
Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1805, n.44 (1999). There is no
analogue in the realm of war powers. On the contrary, with each new collective security
agreement, Congress insists on its power to specifically authorize each individual
commitment of the Armed Forces. See, e.g., NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, Apr. 4, 1949,
art. 11, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 ("This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.").
197. Golove, supra note 163, at 1495-96.
198. Id. at 1496.
199. Id. at 1509-10.
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constitutional challenges to the ratification of the Charter. 200

Despite

these efforts, public opinion polls taken by the State Department in 1944
"showed the public evenly divided on the issue of who should decide
whether to use force in• implementing
collective security actions by an
.• ,,201
international organization.
But such disappointing results are
explained by the fact "that the State Department's massive, and
remarkably successful, public education campaign in support of the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals was [just] beginning to pick up steam."' 02
Golove demonstrates how public opinion was manipulated in support
of ratification of the Charter, but he is unable to demonstrate that the
movement from isolationism towards internationalism took deep root
among the American people. Golove concedes that "there is no simple
means of gauging the movement of general public opinion.,

20 3

But the

history of public response to the engagement of the United States in
foreign wars since Vietnam strongly indicates that the United States has
largely receded into its traditional isolationism.
A constitutional
transformation of the Ackerman variety has to shape public opinion over
several decades; it must become a permanent part of our political
culture. 204 Golove failed to show that the delegation of unilateral war

powers to the Executive in the context of collective security has attained
such status.
While the Supreme Court has given the treaty power broad scope,
holding that it extends to "any matter which is properly the subject of
negotiation with a foreign country, 2 6 the Court also observed that the
treaty power may not be used to "authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government.,

027

It follows

200. Id. at 1511.
201. Id. at 1516, n.96.
202.

Id.

203. Id.
204. In support of his claim of constitutional transformation, Golove cites to numerous
statements made by Senators during their debate on the Charter. Id. at 1518 ("Senator
after senator rose to give solemn speeches affirming the world historical importance of the

Charter and comparing it to Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and other momentous constitutive documents."). While I agree that the
Charter is an immensely important document, I think it is unwise to put too much stock in
the pronouncements of Senators about the importance of the debate in which they are
currently engaged. Regardless of the importance of the Charter, its ratification did not
have to come at the expense of the constitutional allocation of war powers.
205. Golove describes Congress' efforts to preserve its war powers in debates over the
NATO Treaty as fierce. Id. at 1520.
206. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).

207. Id.
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that nothing can be done by treaty that is within the exclusive power of
Congress, unless Congress delegates that power. My reading of the
congressional debates surrounding the United Nations Charter and the
UNPA leads me to conclude that Congress was prepared, in 1945, to
grant only a specific, contingent, and limited delegation of war powers at
that time. However, before Congress could follow through on that
delegation, the Cold War intervened and prevented any such delegation
from occurring. In the decades since the passage of the UNPA, Congress
has never returned to the position it briefly adopted in 1945. While
Congress has specifically approved of military actions undertaken on the
President's initiative, it has never delegated to the President the general
authority to commit the Armed Forces to hostilities without
congressional authorization, regardless of whether the United States was
to engage in hostilities as a sovereign nation or in concert with other
nations as part of a collective security force.
This section has discussed two types of historical arguments in support
of unilateral war powers. The first type of argument draws on the quasiconstitutional custom, according to which Presidents have initiated smallscale and usually defensive engagements of the Armed Forces. While
the Constitution grants the President the power to "repel sudden
attacks" and thus to engage the Armed Forces in order to defend the
United States' territory, possessions, and citizens, the President has no
constitutional power to use the Armed Forces to initiate hostilities or to
embroil the United States in ongoing hostilities. Congress has never
relinquished its constitutional power to control the involvement of the
Armed Forces in war and in hostilities short of war. The second type of
argument draws on the distinction between traditional warfare among
sovereign nations and collective security measures sponsored by
international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO.
While Congress might conceivably delegate its power to commit the
Armed Forces to participation in such collective security measures, it
clearly has not done so. These historical arguments only have force if
bolstered by an underlying theory of inherent executive power to engage
the Armed Forces. That theory is the subject of this Article's final Part.
IV. INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT

John Marshall characterized the President as the "sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
2 8 However, given that Marshall also authored the decision
nations.""
in
208. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). The statement came in the context of a debate
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Little v. Barreme, subordinating the President's war powers to those of
Congress, Marshall's words may speak to the President's ability to
represent the country to foreign governments rather than to her war
powers. Marshall's words are nonetheless frequently invoked by those
who try to explain the extraordinary expansion of the President's foreign
relations powers that has occurred in this century. 2°9 While Marshall's
statement is pertinent to the President's power to negotiate peace, it says
nothing about her power to commit the Armed Forces to hostilities."0
The tension between Marshall's "sole organ" dictum and the opinion he
authored in Little encapsulates the difficulty in balancing the need for a

strong unitary Executive with the requirement of a national foreign
policy responsive to the will of the people, as expressed through their
representatives in Congress.
A.

The Return of the Repressed: Inherent Executive Powers

John Yoo's argument for executive power is the boldest and most
sweeping because, interpreting the writings of the Framers in light of
political theory and practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
he arrives at the surprising conclusion that "the Framers created a
framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war."2 ' Yoo's

argument appears to be textual and historical in nature, but his textual
and historical arguments are implausible, unless considered against the
backdrop of the theory of inherent executive power. Although Yoo
considers the possibility that the Framers did not make explicit the
allocation of authority among the branches so that future politicians
over President's Adams' power to extradite a person charged with murder to Britain. See
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 41, at 60-61 (arguing that Marshall
meant that the President is the sole organ in implementing national policy but not in
making it); GLENNON, supra note 41, at 8 (interpreting Marshall's statement as stressing
the President's duty faithfully to execute the Jay Treaty, which authorized the extradition).
209. The Supreme Court cited Marshall in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), in which the Court asserted that in the "vast" realm of foreign
affairs "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation." Id. at 319.
210. On the President's authority to make binding trade commitments on behalf of the
United States, see Ackerman & Golove, supra note 179 (arguing that the constitutional
foundations for the doctrine empowering the President to execute congressional-executive
agreements are rooted in the World War II years rather than dating back to the Founding
era); Golove, Against Free-Form, supra note 196 (defending the methodology he
developed together with Professor Ackerman against attacks by Lawrence Tribe); Tribe,
supra note 179 (criticizing Ackerman and Golove's theory of constitutional interpretation
as represented in the 1995 article); and Ramsey, supra note 180 (taking an intermediate
position between Ackerman and Golove on the one hand, and Tribe on the other).
211. Yoo, Continuationof Politics,supra note 41, at 170.
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could negotiate the proper balance of war powers, he suggests that their
silence also reflects an intention to adopt the traditional system that they
knew - "executive initiative in war combined with a legislative role via
the spending power." ' He reaches this conclusion after extensive study
of European political theory, the Articles of Confederation, and the
constitutions of the individual American colonies."3
While this
background is by no means irrelevant, one cannot simply postulate the
English practice against which the American colonies revolted and the
failed Confederation as models informing the drafters of the
Constitution.214 Yoo's theory ignores the great efforts expended in the
Revolutionary Era to free the United States from the problems
associated with the excesses of executive power experienced when the
American states had the status of English colonies.
Yoo attacks what he calls "law-office history" in which quotations are
torn out of context and inserted wherever they appear useful to a legal
argument. He chastises other scholars for "dredging up a few selective
21 5
quotes from famous Framers at the Philadelphia Convention.,
According to Yoo, scholars such as John Hart Ely, Michael Glennon,
Louis Henkin, Harold Koh, and Jane Stromseth rely on a "trilogy" of
quotations from the Framers indicating their intent to vest the war power
in the legislature .216 As the quotations provided in this Article
212. Id. at 241; see also Yoo, Cio at War, supra note 108 (criticizing the historical
methodology of legal scholars working in this field and arguing that the Framers expected
the political branches to struggle for control over war).
213. In Continuation of Politics, Yoo devotes twenty pages to a discussion of war
powers under what he calls "the English Constitution" and an additional twenty pages to
the war powers under state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. Yoo,
Continuation of Politics, supra note 41, at t96-241. In Clio at War, Yoo takes as the
starting point for his analysis of the Declare War Clause "the phrase's meaning in
significant Founding era legal documents, principally the British Constitution in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the state constitutions, and the Articles of
Confederation." Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 108, at 1172.
214. The Framers "specifically rejected the British model that allowed the monarch to
take the country to war and to exercise exclusive control over foreign policy." Fisher,
Unchecked Wars, supra note 42, at 1637; see also id. at 1665 ("It is impossible to compare
what Locke and Blackstone advocated to what the Framers provided in Articles I and II
without concluding that the Framers repudiated the British model on war powers.").
Harold Koh concurs, noting that the Framers denied the President the power to declare
war "thereby rejecting the English model of a king who possessed both the power to
declare war and the authority to command troops." KOH, supra note 41, at 76.
215. Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 108, at 1174.
216. Id. at 1179-86. Yoo discusses quotations from James Madison, James Wilson, and
Joseph Story. Id. Yoo claims that the Madison quotation carries little weight because it
derives from a private letter. Id. at 1183. Joseph Story is no authority for Yoo because he
was born after the Revolution and cannot claim the status of a Framer. Id. at 1181.
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demonstrate, however, there is a great deal more evidence available than
Yoo is willing to acknowledge. While Yoo is correct in criticizing the
"law-office" approach to constitutional history, Yoo does not make a
compelling argument for his alternative methodology. It is not at all
obvious that the political treatises Yoo surveys are helpful in explaining
the intents of the Framers in allocating war powers as they did in the
Constitution. Yoo similarly fails to explain why we should think that the
allocation of powers in state constitutions sheds any light on the desired
allocation in the federal government.
Yoo's decision to look to preconstitutional sources may be strategic; the Constitution itself and its
legislative history provide very little support for his position. Noting that
a neutral observer "would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out
of so little," 8 one scholar concludes that the text "tilts decisively towards
21
Congress.
The Framers had a clear enumeration of executive power in mind
when they drafted the Constitution. Speaking at the Federal Convention
in 1787, Alexander Hamilton announced:
The authorities and functions of the executive to be as follows:
to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed; to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun; to have, with the advice and approbation
of the senate, the power of making all treaties; to have the sole
appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of
finance, war, and foreign affairs; to have the nomination of all
other officers, (ambassadors to foreign nations included,)
subject to the approbation or rejection of the senate; to have
the power of pardoning all offences except treason, which he
shall not pardon without the approbation of the senate." 9
Madison added that exclusive executive powers do not include the

Wilson's statement, Yoo claims, addresses federalism concerns as much as it does
separation of powers. 1d. at 1184.
217. Yoo introduces his discussions of state constitutions with conclusory statements
that cite to no authority: "The Framers' experience under the colonial and revolutionary

state government provided the second frame of reference for their thinking on war
powers." Id. at 1197. He says that "[b]y studying the evolution of state constitutions, we
can better understand the Constitution and war powers as part of the Framers' attempt to
cure legislative excess by erecting a unitary, independent executive in the form of the
presidency." Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 41, at 218.
218. REVELEY, supra note 41, at 29.
219. 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 205 (Johnathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1996).
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powers of putting the country in a state of war or peace."" Other
representatives to the Federal Convention harbored still more limited
views of executive power. Roger Sherman considered the Executive to
be Lnothing
more than an instrument for carrying out the will of the
• • .
221
Legislature.
James Wilson simply stated that he did not view the
prerogatives of a British monarch to be a proper guide for establishing
the powers of the American President."' War and peace were in his view
legislative prerogatives. 223 The only strictly executive powers that Wilson
was willing to allow were those of executing the laws and appointing
224
officers.
Even Alexander Hamilton insisted that the President's
powers as Commander-in-Chief were to be "much inferior" to the
powers of the King of Great Britain. 25 While the President commands
the Armed Forces, the King could declare war and raise and regulate
fleets and armies 2 The Constitution grants those additional powers to
the Legislature.
The President's power as Commander-in-Chief is clearly a war power,
but the Framers subordinated that power to congressional war powers by
providing that the United States should not possess a standing army. The
designation "Commander-in-Chief" may not have been intended to
confer any substantive authority to use the Armed Forces except as
128
directed by Congress . 2
It does not appear that the Framers
contemplated any significant role for the President as Commander-inChief in peacetime.
Hamilton stated that "[t]he President will have
only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as
by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the
Union.""" James Iredell, speaking in the North Carolina ratifying
convention, reminded his colleagues that:
The President has not the power of declaring war by his own
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 439.
Id. at 140.
Id.at 141.
Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
HENKIN,supra note 41, at 26.
REVELEY, supra note 41, at 64-65.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 344-350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books

1992). Hamilton, one of the staunchest defenders of executive power, stressed that "[t]he
President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States only when called into actual service of the United States."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies. These powers
are vested in other hands .. . . With regard to the militia, it
must be observed, that though he has command of them when
called into the actual service of the United States, yet he has not
the power of callin 3them out. The power of calling them out is
vested in Congress.
On this interpretation, the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
are simply an instance of her power to execute the laws of Congress.
Yoo's survey of eighteenth-century theorists indicates that the
Executive traditionally held power over the Armed Forces, but the
language these theorists used in defending the traditional position signals
how inapposite it was as a model for the new Republic. "The king is
con[s]idered, in the next place, as the generali[ss]imo, or the fir[s]t in
military command, within the kingdom .... [I]t follows therefore, from
the very end of it's [sic] in[s]titution, that in a monarchy the military
'
power mu[s]t be tru[s]ted in the hands of the prince."232
Joseph Story's
commentaries on the Constitution bring home the American perspective:
The power of the president, too, might well be deemed safe;
since he could not, of himself, declare war, raise armies, or call
forth the militia, or appropriate money for the purpose; for
these powers all belonged to Congress. In Great Britain, the
king is not only commander-in-chief of the army and navy and
militia, but he can declare war; and, in time of war, can raise
armies
and navies, and call forth the militia of his own mere
233
will.
The Framers flat-out rejected the theory of executive power that Yoo
claims they incorporated into the Constitution.
In the face of all of this evidence, Yoo's textual and theoretical
argument must fail on its own terms. Yoo claims to refute the authority
of three statements made by the Framers, but there are dozens of
others. 234 More significantly, Yoo's argument ignores the way in which
the Constitution allocates powers and some of its basic principles. Yoo
eschews the law-office approach, but even a law-office historian would be
231. ELLIOT, supra note 22, at 107-08.
232.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 254

(University of Chicago Press 1979).
233. STORY, supra note 26, at § 1492.
234. The central importance to the Framers of vesting the powers of war in the
Legislature is evident from James Madison's fourth and very public Helvidius letter, in
which he wrote, "In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the
executive department .... War is . . .the true nurse of executive aggrandizement."
Madison, Helvidius 4, supra note 40, at 174.
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hard pressed to find textual evidence in support of the proposition that
the Framers were committed to entrusting the Executive with the power
to put the United States at war or even to commit the Armed Forces to
hostilities absent a threat to its territories or citizens. More to the point,
while the scholars Yoo criticizes utilize quotations from the Framers to
bolster their arguments, the main thrust of their approach tends to rely
not on original intentions but on broader structural arguments about the
design of the Constitution and its role in the historical development of
the federal powers over peace and war. It is ironic that Yoo, who claims
to be a member of the originalist camp,235 should fashion an argument
that is so modern in origin. Although the extent of the President's
defensive war powers were never clearly defined, no officer or organ of
the United States government asserted the President's
constitutional
6
11.11
War
World
after
until
war
initiate
to
power
B.

The Clash of Theories: Inherent versus Limited Executive Power

Advocates of executive power propose the ancient doctrine of inherent
executive power as a means of resolving difficulties surrounding the
source of the federal government's powers over foreign affairs. The
theory of inherent executive power is similar to the delegation theories
discussed above in that it does not rely on any explicit constitutional
grant of power to the Executive. However, while delegation theories
require an explicit or implicit congressional grant of authority to the
Executive to exercise power not granted to the Executive in the
Constitution, the theory of inherent executive power posits certain
powers that are inherent in the very notion of an Executive and therefore
require no explicit enumeration.2 ' The theory of inherent executive
authority ultimately derives from the political tradition to which Yoo
refers, that of the progressive theorists of the European Enlightenment.
These theorists postulated the need for the concentration of certain
powers in the hand of the monarch. To these powers they gave the name
"executive prerogative." Under the old monarchical system, the King
235. Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 108, at 1173.
236. WORMUTH, supra note 41, at 133; ELY, supra note 41, at 10-1l; see also, Fisher,
Unchecked Presidential Wars, supra note 42, at 1637 ("For the most part, the Framers'
model [placing the power of war and peace with the legislative branch] prevailed from
1789 to 1950.").
237. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power:
Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863 (1983) (providing a
general discussion and critical commentary on the Supreme Court's failure to develop a
consistent theory regarding when the President can act without express constitutional or
statutory authority).
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was assumed to have powers not explicitly delegated elsewhere.
According to Blackstone, "the king is and ought to be absolute . . .
[U]nless where the constitution hath expressly, or by evident
consequence, laid down some exception or boundary; declaring, that thus
23 In the
far the prerogative shall go, and no farther.""
American context,
the argument for the President's inherent power is based on the principle
that all powers traditionally exercised by the monarch are assigned to the
President, unless the Constitution specifies otherwise.
John Locke argued that the good of society requires that the Executive
enjoy discretion to deal with problems that the Legislature might be
unable to foresee.239 For Locke, executive prerogative included the
power to act without specific legal authorization or even in contravention
of the law in certain circumstances. 24° These circumstances included
instances where dispatch is required, where laws are inadequate to
provide for all accidents and necessities of public concern, and where the
Executive must have some latitude to do things not prescribed by law.241
Locke imposed theoretical limits on this executive prerogative, but he
did not articulate those limits in very helpful ways. Locke believed that
executive power was only legitimate when it was exercised for the public
good, 242 but he provided no clear guidelines for determining who has the
power to decide when the exercise of executive power is in the public
interest. Blackstone limited the theory of executive prerogative to areas
of exclusive executive power: "By the word prerogative we usually
understand that special pre-eminence, which the king hath over and
above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common
law, in right of his regal dignity.,

243

The theory applies only to those

rights and capacities that the king alone enjoys and not to those he shares
with others.2"
Alexander Hamilton revived the theory of inherent executive power in
his first Pacificus letter, written in defense of President Washington's
decision unilaterally to declare the United States' neutrality in the wars
that erupted in 1793, as the European monarchies confronted the new
238.
239.
240.
241.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 232, at 248, 250.
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 159.
Id. § 160.
Id. Eugene Rostow may well be informed by this Lockean tradition when he

claims that "the President may act, and in some instances he must act, even though
Congress may also act but has not yet done so." Cooper, supra note 66, at 190 (comments
of Eugene V. Rostow).
242. LOCKE, supra note], at §§ 159,161.
243.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 232, at 239.

244. Id.
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French Republic.14' The United States had treaty obligations to France

under 1778 treaties of amity and commerce 46 and alliance.247 The status
of these treaties was unclear once the French revolutionary government
succeeded that of Louis XVI. Hamilton interpreted the general grant of
all executive power to the President to mean that all governmental power
that is not judicial or legislative in character is executive power.24 8 "The
general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER
of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and
qu[allifications which are expressed in the instrument" - these
exceptions included the Senate's participation in the appointment of
officers and the making of treaties, and the power of the Legislature "to
declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal.

2 49

Hamilton

concluded that the treaty-making power, including the power to decide
whether or not the United States is obligated to go to war, is a concurrent
power and that the President has the power to suspend or continue
treaties.25 °
It is perhaps not surprising that Hamilton, an eighteenth-century
thinker, would be attracted to the theory of inherent executive power,
but it is surprising that the theory has attracted support from twentiethcentury enthusiasts of executive power as well. Madison found the
and
"extravagant"
power
executive
of inherent
doctrine
"extraordinary."2 ' He noted that Hamilton got his ideas from the
writings of people like Locke, Vatel, and Montesquieu, who wrote with
monarchical governments in mind.5 2 For Madison, it was perfectly clear
that the power to declare war and make treaties could never fall within a
245. Alexander Hamilton Proclamation of Neutrality, in 32 THE WRITINGS OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 120, at 430-31. The background of the Pacificus and
Helvidius letters is discussed in JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 355-57 (1996).
246. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S. - Fr., 8 Stat. 12, 18(2) Stat. 203, Act
Separate and Secret, 17 Stat 795, 18(2) Stat. 213, T.S. no. 83 (Feb. 6, 1778), annulled by ch.
67, 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
247. Treaty of Alliance, U.S. - France, 4 Stat. 6, 1.8(2) Stat. 201 T.S. No. 82, February
6, 1778, annulled by ch. 67 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
248. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Letter, supra note 67, at 37-39.
249. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
250. Id. at 42. Hamilton stated that:
[T]he participation of the senate in the making of Treaties and the power of the
Legislature to declare war are exceptions out of the general "Executive Power"
vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly - and ought to be
extended no further than is essential to their execution.
Id.
251. Madison, Helvidius 1, supra note 40, at 143.
252. Id. at 144.
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proper definition of executive powers, since all executive acts
presupposed the existence of the laws to be executed: "A declaration
that there shall be war, is not an execution of laws: it does not suppose
pre-existing laws to be executed: it is not, in any respect, an act merely
executive. ''253
For Madison, the doctrine of checks and balances
mandated that the legislature control the decision to go to war:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things,
be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be
commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the
latter functions by a great principle in free government,
analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or
the power of executing from the power of enacting laws."
Madison was convinced that Locke allocated the foreign relations
power to the Executive ' because Locke lived in a monarchy.
In a
republic it was more appropriate to endow the Legislature with that
power.
Yoo has argued that there is little evidence to support exclusive
congressional war powers. 257 However, in the context of the debate
between Hamilton and Madison (as Pacificus and Helvidius
respectively), we find the Framers repeatedly opposing Hamilton's
arguments in favor of unilateral, non-defensive war powers. Although he
concurred with Washington and Hamilton as to the policy of neutrality,
Jefferson sided with Madison in this case, arguing that "a declaration of
neutrality was a declaration [that] there should be no war, to which the
executive was not competent. 2 5 8 Even Eugene Rostow, one of the most
inveterate defenders of executive prerogative in this area, acknowledges
that Washington's proclamation of neutrality would have been without
effect had Congress not passed a neutrality act that implemented the
259

proclamation.
The inapplicability of the theory of executive prerogative to the war
253. Id. at 145.
254. Id. at 148 (emphasis in original).
255. LOCKE, supra note 1, at §§ 146, 148. Advocates of unilateral, non-defensive war
powers thus cite to Locke as envisioning a system of government in which the Executive
has broad discretionary powers, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. See, e.g.,
Cooper, supra note 66, at 167 (remarks of Charles J. Cooper); Yoo, Continuation of
Politics,supra note 41, at 199-200.
256. Madison, Helvidius 1,supra note 40, at 145.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 193-200.
258. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 37 (T. Mason, R. Rutland & J. Sessions eds., 1985).
259. Cooper, supra note 66, at 190 (comments of Eugene V. Rostow).
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powers of the President should be clear to the reader. The theory fails
under Blackstone's definition of executive prerogative, because war
powers are not within the President's exclusive authority."" Locke's
understanding of executive prerogative is more far-reaching because
Locke grants the Executive the power to exercise the prerogative in
certain emergency situations. Under the Constitution, however, the
Tenth Amendment intervenes to prevent a transfer of powers vested in
the Legislature to the Executive. The President may exercise war powers
only subject to congressional authorization or approval. The Tenth
Amendment fixes the allocation of federal powers and prevents the
Executive from asserting extra-constitutional powers.
V.

CONCLUSION

If there were some ambiguity as to the allocation of war powers under
the Constitution, the argument for unilateral, non-defensive war powers
could be justified. However, the Constitution repeatedly and insistently
allocates war powers to Congress and to Congress alone. The President's
constitutional war powers are extremely limited, coming into existence
only when Congress has authorized the use of force. However, when we
consider the history of the United States, we first recall innumerable
instances of bold executive action independent of congressional decisionmaking. Such a view of United States history obscures the role of
Congress in approving and authorizing executive action. On closer
scrutiny, the quasi-constitutional custom of unilateral, non-defensive war
powers turns out to be nothing more than a pattern of post-hoc
congressional approval for executive acts that would not be legal in the
absence of such approval. While the post-war era has seen a sudden
blossoming of theories of unilateral, non-defensive war powers, there has
been no congressional delegation of those powers. On the contrary, the
War Powers Resolution indicates that, in response to executive selfaggrandizement, Congress has used its legislative powers to reinforce its
constitutional powers.
Defenses of unilateral, non-defensive war powers thus only make sense
if they derive from an argument that the President actually shares war
powers with the Legislature, even if the Constitution does not make that
power-sharing arrangement explicit. Hence the significance of the
argument for inherent executive powers. There seems to be nothing to
oppose this argument because it requires no textual justification, and its
historical justification lies in the centuries before the founding of the
260. See text supra accompanying note 220.
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United States. The theory of inherent executive powers appeals to our
common-sense notion (and to our lingering Cold War sensibilities) that
the President must be empowered to make rapid or secret decisions in
times of crisis. But common sense must yield to the clear language and
structure of the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment does not merely
address abuses of federal legislative power; it expresses the general
theory of limited government that is at the heart of our constitutional
system. By stating the supposed truism that whatever is not delegated is
retained, the Tenth Amendment precludes the doctrine of inherent
executive power from having any applicability to the government of the
United States.
While the constitutional allocation of war powers is clear, this paper
has addressed several arguments designed to push that allocation in the
favor of executive power. Because these arguments are without strong
textual or historical foundation, they rely, ultimately, on the theory of
inherent executive authority, a doctrine that cannot be reconciled with
the Tenth Amendment, viewed as a statement of the Constitution's
design of limiting each branch of the federal government to the exercise
of delegated powers. While those powers can be implied or express,
there is no basis, in the constitutional text, in the writings of the Framers,
in political theory, or in the constitutional history of the United States for
transferring powers invested in the Legislature to the Executive.
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